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Beyond Family Law 
Sarah Abramowicz † 
Abstract 
Family law has traditionally been treated as an exceptional field, a 
marginalized and special case in which the usual rules of the legal 
canon do not apply. This Article argues that the current challenge to 
family-law exceptionalism has been largely one way, to the detriment of 
a central concern of family law: the protection of children and of the 
parent-child relationship. Family-law scholars have focused primarily on 
whether and how to import the tools and insights of other areas of law 
into the zone of family relations, while largely overlooking the 
possibility that the tools and insights of family law might instead be 
exported outward, into the rest of the legal canon. In the process, 
family-law scholars have contributed to an already existing blind spot 
regarding the extent to which the conditions of child rearing are 
affected, often profoundly, by jurisprudence that we do not think of as 
involving family relations, but that affects the conditions of children’s 
development by affecting their parents or caretakers. 
This Article considers how family law’s perspective on children’s 
interests might be exported into areas of law that affect children 
indirectly. The Article investigates two paradigmatic fields in which 
children’s interests may be affected by cases involving their parents: 
criminal law and contracts. By using the perspective of family law to 
examine the relevance of children’s interests to criminal law and 
contracts, the Article shows how taking children’s interests into 
account in cases involving their parents can further the internal 
consistency and legitimacy of each field. The Article builds upon this 
rationale to formulate a model for assessing when and how it is 
appropriate for courts to factor children’s interests into their decision 
making in cases that involve children only indirectly. 
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Introduction 
Family law has traditionally been treated as an exceptional field, a 
marginalized and special case in which the usual rules of the legal 
canon, such as the ordinary operation of contracts, criminal sanctions, 
and torts, do not apply.1 Many family law scholars today are engaged 
in challenging this family law exceptionalism.2 For several years, 
scholars have contested the suspension of the usual rules of law within 
the specialized zone of family relations.3 More recently, others have 
begun to argue for importing the tools and insights of other legal fields 
into family law, for instance by applying fiduciary law,4 tort law,5 or 
partnership law6 to problems within family law, or by recognizing the 
constructions of the family by seemingly unrelated areas of law such as 
criminal law and welfare law.7 
 
1. See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 
825, 840–41 (2004) (noting the suspension of usual legal rules within the 
family domain, in the form of judicial refusal to enforce inter-spousal 
contracts for domestic services, differential treatment of marital rape, 
and inter-spousal tort immunity).  
2. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 
Harv. L. Rev. 491 (2005) (contending that the law refuses to 
countenance certain types of economic exchange within the family in 
order to signal the sanctity of intimate relations, and in the process 
exacerbates the deprivations of women and the poor).  
3. See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 1, at 839–42 (arguing that the suspension 
of the usual rules of contracts, criminal law, and torts within the family 
reflects the persistence of the gendered doctrine of coverture); Katharine 
B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 65, 134 (1998) (contending that the selective non-enforcement 
of the non-monetary aspect of premarital agreements betokens a refusal 
to recognize the value of domestic labor); Dan Markel, Jennifer M. 
Collins, and Ethan J. Leib, Privilege or Punish: Criminal 
Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, at xii–xiii (2009) 
(criticizing the suspension of the ordinary rules of criminal law within 
the family, which the authors characterize as creating either “family ties 
benefits” or “family ties burdens”).  
4. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 
81 Va. L. Rev. 2401, 2401–02 (1995) (employing the tools of fiduciary 
law and agency theory to reconceptualize the parent-child relationship). 
5. See, e.g., Twila L. Perry, No-Fault Divorce and Liability Without Fault: 
Can Family Law Learn from Torts?, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 55, 57 (1991) 
(applying tort-law analysis to the problem of alimony). 
6. See, e.g., Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A 
Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation 
Under No-Fault, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 67 (1993) (reconceptualizing 
marriage and divorce from the standpoint of business partnership law). 
7. See Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal 
Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 Va. L. Rev. 385 (2008) 
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This Article argues that the current challenge to family-law 
exceptionalism has been largely one way, to the detriment of a central 
concern of family law: the protection of children and of the parent-
child relationship. Family law scholars have focused primarily on 
whether and how to import the tools and insights of other areas of 
law into the zone of family relations,8 while largely overlooking the 
possibility that the tools and insights of family law might instead be 
exported outward, into the rest of the legal canon. In the process, 
family law scholars have contributed to an already existing blind spot 
regarding the extent to which the conditions of child rearing are 
affected, often profoundly, by cases that we do not think of as 
involving family relations. 
While family law attends with care to the ways in which the 
situation of parents affects their children’s development and well-
being, other areas of law either marginalize or ignore entirely the 
extent to which what happens to a parent can affect a child as well. 
This Article considers how family law’s perspective on children’s 
interests might be exported into areas of law that affect children 
indirectly by affecting their parents. The Article will consider two 
paradigmatic instances of fields in which children’s interests may be 
affected by cases involving their parents: criminal law and contracts. 
In criminal law, children are affected especially profoundly by 
cases involving the incarceration of their parents. How to treat 
children’s interests in such situations has long been a puzzle within 
criminal law. By considering children’s interests from within the 
limited perspective of their own doctrinal field, however, criminal-law 
scholars in favor of taking children’s interests into account have 
struggled to articulate a convincing theoretical rationale for doing so, 
while those opposed have reached the conclusion that children’s 
interests are collateral to, or even at odds with, the overarching goals 
and premises of criminal law.9 This Article turns that conclusion on 
its head, showing that, when viewed from the perspective of family 
 
(suggesting that family law look to these and other areas of law to 
expand its conception of caregiving relationships). 
8. Others argue for including within the family-law canon areas of law that 
regulate familial rights and responsibilities but are not traditionally 
recognized as family law, such as welfare law, see Hasday, supra note 1, 
at 892–98 (“The exclusion of welfare law from the family law canon has 
allowed legal authorities to avoid explaining why the law applies very 
different rules to govern familial rights and responsibilities in poor 
families.”), and immigration law, see Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law 
and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625, 1633 (2007) 
(demonstrating the ways in which immigration law regulates marriage 
and arguing that “conceiving of immigration law as a form of family law 
. . . could alter the way we understand both immigration law and family 
law”). 
9. See discussion infra Part II.A.3. 
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law’s insights about the nature and importance of childhood, taking 
children’s interests into account can be seen as furthering and 
enhancing the goals and legitimacy of criminal law. 
In contract law, by contrast, scholars are often blind entirely to 
the ways in which children are affected by cases involving their 
parents. Currently, contracts scholars consider children’s interests 
only in cases involving contracts that regulate the family directly.10 
These agreements, such as surrogacy and adoption contracts, are 
typically excised altogether from the realm of contract law and 
relegated to the specialized region of family-law exceptionalism, in 
which the ordinary rules of contract law do not apply. On the other 
hand, there is almost no discussion by contracts scholars regarding 
the ways in which children are affected by non-familial contracts 
involving their parents, such as ordinary commercial contracts or 
consumer agreements. This Article uses the perspective of family law 
to consider whether children’s interests should be taken into account 
in such cases. 
By using the perspective of family law to examine the relevance of 
children’s interests across the legal canon, this Article shows how 
taking children’s interests into account in cases involving their 
parents can be seen as furthering the internal consistency of criminal 
and contract law, as well as promoting certain goals and premises 
that are shared across a range of doctrinal fields. The Article builds 
upon this rationale to formulate a model for assessing when and how 
it is appropriate for courts to factor children’s interests into their 
decision making in cases that involve children only indirectly. 
The Article begins, in Part I, by investigating what family law 
assumes about why children’s interests matter. It does so by analyzing 
the one area of law in which children’s interests are paramount: child 
custody disputes. In assessing children’s interests in the context of 
custody disputes, courts articulate the myriad ways in which the 
conditions of child development form the adult self. This articulation 
brings to light, as most legal discussions do not, the extent to which 
unchosen conditions of child development—such as parenting, 
education, and socioeconomic status—can either expand or 
circumscribe the choices available to each adult. Part I ends by 
drawing out the insights of courts deciding custody disputes about the 
connection between the conditions of child development, on the one 
hand, and the extent to which each child is likely to function as a 
productive and autonomous adult, on the other. 
Part II employs family law’s insights about the importance of 
child development to examine how children are affected in cases 
involving their parents in two doctrinal areas: criminal law and 
contract law. Focusing on two exemplary situations—the 
 
10. See discussion infra Part II.B.3. 
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incarceration of parents under criminal law and the enforcement 
under contract law of agreements to which the parents of minor 
children are parties—Part II uses the insights about child 
development articulated by family law to show the extent to which 
children’s development is potentially affected by legal cases involving 
their parents in both fields. Part II then describes the current 
treatment of children’s interests in cases involving their parents in 
criminal law and contract law, and the scholarly debate within each 
field about whether children’s interests should be taken into account. 
Part II ends by showing the limits of, and gaps within, the current 
scholarly debate about children’s interests in both doctrinal areas. 
In Part III, the Article develops a new rationale for taking 
children’s interests into account across the legal canon, even in cases 
where children are affected only indirectly. Much recent scholarship 
on children’s interests argues that these should be taken into account 
to promote deliberative democracy; the argument is that facilitating 
children’s development is a necessary precondition of social 
citizenship.11 Another argument for facilitating optimal conditions of 
child development is that this is necessary to compensate caretakers 
for their unrecognized contribution to the social good.12 This Article 
contributes a new perspective to the debate by grounding the 
argument for attending to children’s interests in the underlying 
assumptions within and across the various doctrinal areas in which 
children are affected by cases that involve them indirectly.  
The central such assumption is a model of the legal subject that is 
taken for granted by a number of legal fields, including criminal law 
and contract law. As Part III demonstrates, both criminal law and 
contract law, when discussing the actions of competent adults, assume 
a legal subject who is autonomous in the sense of both free and 
rational, and as such can be held responsible for his or her actions and 
decisions. Part III then shows how the insights of family law 
contradict this model. When family-law courts discuss which custodial 
outcome is in a child’s best interests, they acknowledge the extent to 
which each adult is formed by his or her childhood experience. They 
 
11. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, The Place of Families: Fostering 
Capacity, Equality, And Responsibility 85 (2006) (noting “[t]hat 
society counts on families” to prepare children to “take their place as 
capable, responsible, self-governing members of society”); Anne C. 
Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 431, 433 (2006) (“The 
implications of developmental research for constitutional law are simply 
stated: When sufficiently responsive to a young child’s needs, early 
caregiving relationships help to cultivate the cognitive and emotional 
processes that are the foundation for adult citizenship.”).  
12. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Autonomy Myth 44–48 
(2004) (arguing that society owes a collective debt to caretakers and 
therefore needs to support and facilitate their “society-preserving 
labor”). 
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acknowledge, moreover, that a relatively deficient or optimal 
upbringing can either limit or enhance the rational capacity of, and 
the range of free choices available to, the adult that each child 
becomes. Family law thus brings into question the assumptions about 
individual autonomy that, as Part III demonstrates, underlie a 
number of doctrinal fields that deal with the actions of adults, such as 
criminal law and contract law. Part III concludes that taking 
children’s interests into account in cases involving their parents can 
be seen as enhancing the consistency and legitimacy of these doctrinal 
fields. 
Part IV builds upon this rationale to formulate a model for assessing 
when and how it is appropriate for courts to take children’s interests into 
account in cases involving their parents. It develops this model by 
investigating how we can best promote the goals and premises of each 
doctrinal area of law, such as the model of individual autonomy shared 
by criminal law and contract law, while at the same time balancing the 
policy needs of each field.  
The model developed in Part IV does not call for taking children’s 
interests into account in every instance where they are potentially at 
stake, or for making children’s interests the primary consideration. 
Part IV concludes that we should take children’s interests into 
account in cases involving state action against parents, such as 
criminal prosecution. Children’s interests in these cases should not 
trump every other consideration, as they do in family law. But when 
the state acts to reshape the family in ways that adversely affect a 
child’s development, it should consider the likely effect on the child’s 
future capacities as an adult and should balance this against the 
competing policy concerns specific to the relevant doctrinal field, such 
as, in criminal law, deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation.  
Part IV also contends, however, that courts should not take 
children’s interests into account in instances of private litigation, such 
as contract disputes, unless that litigation concerns a scenario that is 
likely to affect children in a systemic way. When courts and 
legislatures encounter a type of private litigation that repeatedly 
affects children, they should fashion rules that protect children but 
apply regardless of whether children are involved in a particular case. 
These across-the-board rules would promote children’s interests 
without incurring the risks of unfairness, inefficiency, and parental 
disempowerment that would occur if children’s interests were taken 
into account in private litigation on a case-by-case basis. 
I. Best-Interests Exceptionalism and Family Law’s 
Insights on Child Development  
Judicial concern with how children develop into their adult selves is 
largely limited to one of the most anomalous areas of the legal canon: 
family law’s “best interests of the child” analysis. As this Part will 
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discuss in Section A, courts rarely apply the best-interests test. When 
they do, however, they embark on a legal analysis that makes children’s 
interests paramount. The result, as this Part will discuss in Section B, 
is to provide an unusually robust perspective on how children develop, 
one that recognizes—to an extent unmatched elsewhere in legal 
analysis—the connection between children’s upbringing and early 
experience and the type of adult that each child becomes.  
A. Bests-Interests Exceptionalism 
Family law’s “best interests of the child” analysis is exceptional in 
both applicability and scope. Only in certain carefully delineated 
instances do courts apply the best-interests standard. Once applied, 
however, the best-interests analysis is exceptionally broad, and 
employs a methodology both substantively and procedurally distinct 
from most modes of legal analysis and decision making. This Section 
will discuss the most salient aspects of best-interests exceptionalism—
when the standard is used and how it works. It will then discuss the 
rationale behind this exceptional legal standard.  
1. Limited Applicability of the Best-Interests Analysis 
The “best interests of the child” analysis is typically triggered 
whenever two or more adults, each with equal rights to a child, ask a 
court to resolve a dispute about the child’s upbringing or custody.13 In 
its most familiar form, this type of dispute occurs when the parents of 
a child divorce or separate. Every state in the United States, as well 
as most foreign jurisdictions, resolves such disputes with reference to 
the best-interests standard.14  
After the initial allocation of custody, the best-interests analysis 
can be triggered again in the course of subsequent disagreements. 
Parents may ask the court to revisit the original custody award15 or 
they may ask the court to resolve differences regarding various 
aspects of a child’s upbringing, ranging from the details of a child’s 
 
13. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Child Custody in the Age of 
Children’s Rights: The Search for a Just and Workable Standard, 33 
Fam L.Q. 815, 815–16 (1999). 
14. See generally id. (describing the dominance of the best-interests 
approach in custody decision making); see also Naomi R. Cahn, 
Reframing Child Custody Decisionmaking, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 1, 5 (1997) 
(“Today, when married or unmarried parents separate, both parents 
have equal rights to custody under a best interest of the child 
standard . . . .”).  
15. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(a) (2011) (“Either parent may 
petition to enforce or modify any court order regarding custody and 
visitation.”). 
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education16 or medical care17 to a parent’s right to relocate.18 In these 
situations, the triggering of the best-interests analysis is not 
automatic. When a parent requests a change in custody, most 
jurisdictions require that an initial burden—such as a showing of a 
material change of circumstances—be met before a court will revisit 
its initial decision by re-engaging in a full-fledged best-interests 
analysis.19 Courts are even more averse to resolving differences over 
the details of a child’s upbringing, and will often avoid the need to do 
so by dividing up decision-making authority over various aspects of 
the child’s life.20 In a number of jurisdictions, however, courts will, in 
some circumstances, resolve such disputes with reference to a child’s 
best interests.21 
The “best interests of the child” analysis is also used in 
proceedings for termination of parental rights or adoptive placements. 
 
16. See, e.g., Lombardo v. Lombardo, 507 N.W.2d 788, 792 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1993) (remanding to the trial court for determination of which school 
placement was in the child’s best interests, where divorced parents 
disagreed). 
17. See, e.g., Harder v. Anderson, Arnold, Dickey, Jensen, Gullickson and 
Sanger, L.L.P., 764 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Iowa 2009) (“When joint legal 
custodians have a genuine disagreement concerning a course of 
treatment affecting a child’s medical care, the court must step in as an 
objective arbiter, and decide the dispute by considering what is in the 
best interest of the child.”). 
18. See, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 14-09-07(1) (2009) (“A parent with 
primary residential responsibility for a child may not change the 
primary residence of the child to another state except upon order of the 
court or with the consent of the other parent, if the other parent has 
been given parenting time by the decree.”). 
19. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) (2011) (“A court having 
jurisdiction may modify an order concerning the care, custody and 
visitation of the children if there is a showing by either parent of a 
material change in circumstances since the entry of the order in question 
and that the modification would be in the best interests of the 
children . . . .”); see also, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 767.451(1) (2010) 
(requiring a showing of harm to modify a custody order within two 
years and a finding of a substantial change of circumstances and that 
modification is in the best interests of the child to modify the order after 
two years have passed).  
20. See, e.g., Brzozowski v. Brzozowski, 625 A.2d 597, 600 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Ch. Div. 1993) (giving residential parent the right to make decisions 
regarding nonemergency medical care in the event of disagreement with 
the nonresidential parent, absent a clear showing that a given decision 
would be contrary to the child’s interests). 
21. See, e.g., Jordan v. Rea, 212 P.3d 919, 928–29 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) 
(directing the trial court to consider the child’s best interests in 
determining school placement where divorced parents disagreed, and 
collecting cases from other jurisdictions taking the same approach). 
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Here, a high initial bar must be met before a court can assess a child’s 
best interests. In order to terminate parental rights in the absence of 
consent, a court must first establish an independent ground for doing 
so, typically some form of abuse, abandonment, or neglect.22 Once the 
court finds a sufficient basis for terminating parental rights, it engages 
in the best-interests analysis to assess whether termination is in the 
child’s interests.23 Where an adoptive placement is at issue, the court 
typically must first terminate parental rights, on the basis of both 
grounds for termination and a best-interests assessment, and then 
determine whether the placement is in the child’s interests.24 
On the other hand, children’s interests are never assessed or 
second-guessed in an intact family that shows no evidence of 
endangering its children. Nor are they assessed in the initial allocation 
of parental rights. A few scholars have proposed that courts consider 
children’s interests in determining who has the right to parent a 
newborn child. In the early 1980s, ethical philosopher Hugh LaFollette 
made the provocative suggestion that states institute a licensing 
requirement for becoming a parent, arguing that the state has an 
 
22. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 (2011) (outlining various grounds 
for terminating parental rights). 
23. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292 (Supp. I 2010) (providing for 
termination of parental rights where court both finds a ground for 
termination and determines such termination to be in the child’s best 
interests). 
24. See 1 Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption Law and Practice 
§ 4.04(1) (2009); see also, e.g., Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 162.016(a) 
(“If a petition requesting termination has been joined with a petition 
requesting adoption, the court . . . must make separate findings that the 
termination is in the best interest of the child and that the adoption is 
in the best interest of the child.”).  
A number of jurisdictions have special rules that apply to stepparent 
adoptions. Where a stepparent petitions to adopt the child of a spouse 
who has custody of the child, the nonresidential parent may lose the 
right to consent to the adoption, and thus face unwanted termination of 
his or her parental rights, by having failed to communicate with the 
child or to pay support for a certain period of time. See, e.g., La. Child 
Code Ann. art. 1245 (Supp. 2012) (dispensing with consent 
requirement for stepparent adoption where the nonresidential parent 
fails without just cause to communicate with the child or to pay support 
for at least six months). In that event, the court will order an adoption, 
and terminate parental rights accordingly, if it finds that to do so is in 
the child’s best interests. See, e.g., La. Child Code Ann. art. 1255 
(2004) (providing for a rebuttable presumption that adoption is in the 
child’s best interests where the court has granted custody to the parent 
married to the stepparent petitioner); In re Leitch, 732 So. 2d 632, 635 
(La. Ct. App. 1999) (taking into consideration the effect on the child of 
severing ties with the nonresidential parent).  
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obligation to ensure that each child has an optimal upbringing.25 
James Dwyer has recently made a modified version of this argument, 
proposing that the state deny parental rights at the outset to those 
who seem particularly likely to become unfit parents.26 The broad 
consensus, however, is that we must have clear default rules allocating 
initial parental rights, with the possibility of subsequently removing 
children from parents who have demonstrated unfitness in the form of 
abuse or neglect. 
The best-interests analysis, then, is used only in certain limited 
circumstances. Parents either must invite the court to interfere in 
their parenting by virtue of their disagreement with one another or 
they must have harmed, abandoned, or endangered their child in a 
significant way. The law assigns initial parental rights without any 
assessment of children’s interests, and, absent evidence of harm, 
allows parents to raise their children as they see fit. In the majority of 
families, children develop into adulthood without any judicial 
assessment of their interests. 
2. Broad Scope and Methodology of the Best-Interests Analysis 
While limited in applicability, the best-interests analysis, once 
triggered, is exceptionally far ranging. Judges engaged in a best-
interests assessment can consider any aspect of a child’s life, and they 
take a much more active role in truth seeking than is typical for a 
judge in the American legal system.27 From its inception in the 
nineteenth century, the best-interests inquiry has been, in the words of 
one court, more of an “inquest” than a civil trial.28 The court can order 
a psychological evaluation,29 and can also appoint a guardian ad litem 
 
25. Hugh LaFollette, Licensing Parents, 9 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 182, 182 
(1980). 
26. See James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States’ Continued 
Consignment of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 
407, 409 (2008). 
27. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.425(1) (2011) (“[T]he court may cause 
an investigation to be made as to the character, family relations, past 
conduct, earning ability and financial worth of the parties for the 
purpose of protecting the children’s future interest.”). 
28. See Gishwiler v. Dodez, 4 Ohio St. 615, 619 (1855) (describing custody 
inquiry as “a proceeding partaking more of the character of an inquest 
than of a trial”). 
29. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.425(2) (“The court, on its own motion 
or on the motion of a party, may order an independent physical, 
psychological, psychiatric or mental health examination of a party or 
the children and may require any party and the children to be 
interviewed, evaluated and tested by an expert or panel of experts.”). 
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who will make an independent assessment of the child’s interests.30 
Judges making custody determinations also frequently interview 
children in camera, to learn the children’s preferences as well as to get a 
sense of the children’s relationships with their parents.31  
In addition to being atypical procedurally, family law’s best-
interests assessment is unusually open ended. One of the frequent 
criticisms of the best-interests standard is the great amount of 
discretion it affords judges to determine how and by whom children 
are raised.32 Courts and legislatures have, for over a century, tried to 
cabin judicial discretion in child-custody decision making by imposing 
various preferences.33 The nineteenth century saw a shift from a 
preference for fathers to one for mothers, particularly in cases 
involving children “of tender years”;34 by the 1980s, the maternal 
preference had been largely abandoned, and gave way, in some 
jurisdictions, to a preference for the primary caretaker,35 which in 
turn was subsequently rejected in favor of the open-ended best-
interests standard that prevails today.36 A few jurisdictions today 
prefer joint custody,37 and West Virginia presumes that custody 
 
30. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Representing Children, 19 J. Am. Acad. 
Matrimonial Law. 183, 192 (2005) (“[I]n the context of custody 
disputes . . . most states grant full discretion to courts in deciding 
whether to appoint a representative for the child.”).  
31. See Barbara A. Atwood, The Child’s Voice in Custody Litigation: An 
Empirical Survey and Suggestions for Reform, 45 Ariz. L. Rev. 629, 
638 (2003) (noting that a majority of judges surveyed “agreed that 
judges can acquire a better understanding of the child and the parties 
through an in camera interview”).  
32. See Linda D. Elrod & Milfred D. Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum 
Swings in Child Custody: The Interests of Children in the Balance, 42 
Fam. L.Q. 381, 397 (2008) (“The outcomes of child custody disputes 
remain difficult to predict and may rely on the judge’s ‘gut’ feeling tied 
to a factor.”). 
33. See id. at 393 (“The last forty years have seen various attempts to reign 
[sic] in judicial discretion with new presumptions, preferences, and lists 
of factors.”). 
34. See Mason, From Father’s Property to Children’s Rights 50–87 
(1994). 
35. See id. at 121–33. 
36. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender Difference 
in the Law: Revaluing the Caretaker Role, 31 Harv. J.L. & Gender 1, 
48–49 (2008) (noting that “in practice, even in the few states that have 
established or considered the presumption, the primary caretaker 
presumption has all but disappeared in favor of a more discretionary 
best interest standard”). 
37. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.13(2)(c)(2) (West Supp. 2012) (“The 
court shall order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be 
shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared parental 
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should be awarded by approximating the amount of time that each 
parent spent in caring for the child prior to separation.38 Typically, 
however, judges have the freedom to consider a number of factors in 
assessing children’s interests, including the child’s attachments to 
each parent,39 the child’s need for continuity,40 each parent’s moral 
fitness,41 and the ability and willingness of each parent to foster a 
positive relationship with the other parent42—a list that, when 
provided for by statute, typically ends with a catch-all clause allowing 
courts to consider any other factor that has bearing on a child’s well-
being.43 
Finally, the court’s finding of a child’s best interests is exceptional 
in that it trumps a number of other significant interests, including the 
needs and rights of the parents.44 From the earliest custody disputes, 
courts have held that once the best-interests assessment is 
 
responsibility would be detrimental to the child.”); see also Elrod & 
Dale, supra note 32, at 397 (“Joint legal custody, which allows both 
parents to retain decision-making authority, solved the ‘winners and 
losers’ problem for judges.”). 
38. See W. Va. Code Ann. § 48-9-206(a) (LexisNexis 2009) (“Unless 
otherwise resolved by agreement of the parents . . . or unless manifestly 
harmful to the child, the court shall allocate custodial responsibility so 
that the proportion of custodial time the child spends with each parent 
approximates the proportion of time each parent spent performing 
caretaking functions for the child prior to the parents’ 
separation . . . .”).  
39. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.23(a) (2012) (directing custody 
court assessing best interests of the child to consider “[t]he love, 
affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties involved 
and the child”). 
40. See, e.g., § 722.23(d) (directing court to consider “[t]he length of time 
the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, and the 
desirability of maintaining continuity”). 
41. See, e.g., § 722.23(f) (directing court to consider “[t]he moral fitness of 
the parties involved”). 
42. See, e.g., § 722.23(j) (directing court to consider “[t]he willingness and 
ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a close and 
continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other 
parent or the child and the parents”). 
43. See, e.g., § 722.23(l ) (directing court to take into account “any other 
factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child 
custody dispute”). 
44. See, e.g., Kuntz v. Allen, 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 105, 108 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 
1987) (“The paramount concern of the court in any case involving the 
custody or visitation of children is the welfare and best interest of the 
child. All other considerations, including the rights of parents, are 
secondary and subordinate to a child’s physical, intellectual, moral, 
spiritual and emotional well-being.” (citations omitted)). 
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undertaken, a court awarding custody will not consider how a parent 
stands to be affected by the outcome45 unless the parent’s well-being 
itself has bearing on the child’s interests.46  
Among the parental interests routinely trumped by the best-
interests-of-the-child standard are a number of constitutional rights 
that our legal system typically fiercely protects. Thus, parents’ First 
Amendment rights are frequently outweighed by a custody court’s 
determination of a child’s interests.47 Courts allocating custody can, 
and often do, consider a parent’s religious practices and other beliefs 
or forms of expression.48 Where a custody court finds a child 
endangered by a parent’s speech or religious practices, it can even 
impose a gag order on parents, or require them to engage in or refrain 
from engaging in certain religious practices with their children—an 
incursion into freedom of speech and of religion rarely countenanced 
in our legal system.49  
A child’s best interests also routinely trump a parent’s right to 
travel; parents can be, and frequently are, prevented from retaining 
custody of their children if they decide to relocate.50 Parents’ right to 
privacy is similarly minimal in the face of a court’s best-interests 
assessment; in a number of jurisdictions, for instance, courts can order 
 
45. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. McGinn, 188 P. 472, 473 (Wash. 1920) (“[T]he 
welfare of the children, and not the wishes of the parents, should govern 
the court in matters of this kind . . . .”); Corrie v. Corrie, 4 N.W. 213, 
214 (Mich. 1880) (“In contests of this kind the opinion is now nearly 
universal that neither of the parties has any rights that can be allowed 
to seriously militate against the welfare of the child. The paramount 
consideration is what is really demanded by its best interests.”). 
46. See, e.g., Ireland v. Ireland, 717 A.2d 676, 681 (Conn. 1998) (noting, in 
the context of a custodial parent’s request to relocate, that “the child’s 
interests can become so intricately interwoven with the well-being of the 
new family unit [created by divorce] that the determination of the 
child’s best interest requires that the interests of the custodial parent be 
taken into account” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
47. See Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech 
Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 631 (2006) (critiquing extent to which 
custody decisions interfere with parents’ freedom of speech and of 
religion).  
48. See Jennifer Ann Drobac, Note, For the Sake of the Children: Court 
Consideration of Religion in Child Custody Cases, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 
1609, 1631–40 (1998) (finding that while some jurisdictions require 
actual or possible harm to the child before taking a parent’s religious 
practice into account in awarding custody, others permit consideration 
of religion even in the absence of possible harm). 
49. See Volokh, supra note 47, at 631 (collecting cases). 
50. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.31 (2012) (restricting custodial 
parent from moving over 100 miles from initial residence without 
judicial approval). 
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that parents not have an overnight romantic visitor while their child 
is in the house.51 The only constitutional provision that has been 
found to trump a child’s best interests in the custody context is the 
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which the Supreme 
Court held prevented a custody court from taking into account the 
stigma a child would suffer from living in an interracial household.52 
Even here, however, lower courts have often allowed the consideration 
of race when awarding custody, as long as the award is not based on 
overt racial prejudice.53 Children’s interests are considered sufficiently 
powerful to justify incursions into constitutionally protected domains 
that would be forbidden elsewhere in the legal canon. 
3. Rationales for Best-Interests Exceptionalism 
a. Rationale for Limited Applicability: Parental Autonomy 
Given the wide-ranging nature of judicial inquiry and oversight 
once the best-interests standard is employed, it is understandable that 
the occasions on which courts engage in a full-fledged best-interests 
assessment are limited. To allow the best-interests “inquest”54 to 
become widespread would infringe on parental autonomy and family 
privacy. 
Parental autonomy is protected under the Constitution as a 
fundamental right.55 This protection stems in part from parents’ own 
 
51. See, e.g., Muller v. Muller, No. 259271, 2005 WL 2810399, at *1 (Mich. 
Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2005) (per curiam) (upholding trial court order 
preventing parents from having “an unrelated member of the opposite 
sex overnight while having parenting time with the minor children”). 
52. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1984). 
53. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 658 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550 (App. Div. 1997) 
(holding, in a case discussing which parent could better nurture the 
child’s biracial identity, that while “race is not a dominant, controlling 
or crucial factor[, it] must be weighed along with all other material 
elements of the lives of [the] family” (second alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
54. Gishwiler v. Dodez, 4 Ohio St. 615, 618 (1855).  
55. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–74 (2000) (finding that a 
statute as applied to permit the court to order third-party visitation 
over a parent’s objection, on the basis that to do so was in the child’s 
best interests, violated the parent’s fundamental right to make decisions 
concerning the care, custody, and control of her children); Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (striking down a law 
requiring attendance at public school as violating “the liberty of parents 
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under 
their control”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–401 (1923) 
(holding that the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment includes the right of parents to “bring up 
children” and to “control the education of their own,” and striking down 
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interests in the custody and care of their children,56 and in part from 
concerns about the policy implications of infringing on parental 
rights.57 Parental autonomy is widely seen as necessary to promote 
the pluralistic society that is essential to our liberal democracy.58 In 
the words of a foundational Supreme Court decision protecting 
parents’ rights to control the education and upbringing of their 
children, these rights are necessary to prevent the government from 
“standardiz[ing] its children” by dictating how and by whom they are 
raised.59 
The limited applicability of the best-interests assessment serves to 
protect parental autonomy by leaving the majority of families free 
from judicial oversight. In an intact family that shows no evidence of 
endangering its children, parents are free to raise their children as 
they see fit. Parental autonomy is similarly facilitated by having clear 
default rules determining who has the right to parent a newborn 
child. These default rules have become murky in the wake of assisted 
reproductive technology and other recent changes in family forms.60 
However, we do not, as a general matter, assess children’s interests 
before making the original allocation of parental rights. There is 
 
a prohibition on foreign language instruction as an unconstitutional 
infringement on this liberty). 
56. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (“[T]he interest of parents in the care, 
custody, and control of their children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the 
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”). 
57. See Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 
63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 937, 940–41 (1996) (enumerating rationales for 
robust protections of parental autonomy); see also Maxine Eichner, Who 
Should Control Children’s Education?: Parents, Children, and the State, 
75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1339, 1340 (2007) (arguing that a liberal democracy 
must protect parental autonomy while also accommodating 
countervailing interests, in particular “the need for children to develop 
the autonomy that liberalism demands”). 
58. See Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 
Tul. L. Rev. 955, 1022 (1993) (tracing the development of the 
constitutional doctrine of family privacy and noting that the “diverse 
ways of life promoted by differing family traditions . . . nourish our 
liberal political system” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
59. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. 
60. See Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?): Marriage, Gender, and 
Assisted Reproductive Technology, 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1177 (2010) 
(noting that children born to unmarried couples through assisted 
reproductive technology often fall outside the scope of parentage rules 
that apply only to heterosexual married couples, and arguing that the 
resulting uncertainty in parental rights and obligations renders children 
financially vulnerable); Cahn, supra note 14, at 36–48 (discussing 
potential solutions to the “indeterminacy of definitions of parenthood” 
in light of “the new reproductive technologies as well as the changing 
shape of the American family”). 
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general agreement that—even apart from the question of a “natural” 
parent’s fundamental right to the custody of his or her children—to 
assess children’s interests in making the initial determination of 
parental rights would give the state too much power to determine 
how its citizens are formed.61 
b. Rationale for Broad Scope: The Importance of Child Development 
to the Adult Self 
Given the importance we attribute to allowing parents to raise 
their children as they see fit, in the name of what countervailing 
interest do we allow courts to infringe on parental autonomy to the 
extent that they do once they engage in the best-interests inquiry? 
Particularly in today’s society, where divorce and custody disputes 
are routine, we do not fault parents for divorcing or for disputing 
custody of their children. The best-interests inquiry is not a 
punishment; we do not characterize the parents in these cases as 
wrongdoers who have, in acting badly, lost their right to autonomy.62  
The justification for the exceptional scope of family law’s best-
interests inquiry—a justification so powerful that it outweighs our 
almost equally powerful concern with family privacy—lies in the 
special nature of children and of childhood. Child-custody 
jurisprudence tells us that children require special protection in part 
because they are helpless. In the earliest Anglo-American custody 
cases, when the power of courts to intervene in custody disputes was 
first challenged, courts responded that they were empowered to step 
in as necessary to protect children’s interests under the parens patriae 
 
61. See, e.g., David D. Meyer, The Constitutionality of “Best Interests” 
Parentage, 14 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 857, 857 (2006) (“[T]o 
imagine a new law of parentage focused exclusively on the needs and 
interests of children . . . assumes a governmental control over the 
question of parentage that would strike many as alien.”); Johnson v. 
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 n.10 (1993) (“[To] decide parentage based on 
the best interests of the child . . . raises the repugnant specter of 
governmental interference in matters implicating our most fundamental 
notions of privacy, and confuses concepts of parentage and custody.”); 
see also Cahn, supra note 14, at 44–60 (arguing that two-step approach 
by which courts first identify a child’s parents and then award custody 
in accordance with the child’s interests helps to limit judicial discretion 
in determining parental status); Mary Patricia Byrn & Jenni Vainik 
Ives, Which Came First the Parent or the Child?, 62 Rutgers L. Rev. 
305, 330 (2010) (arguing that children’s interests require that states 
create clear default rules that will clarify legal parentage from the 
moment of birth). 
62. See, e.g., Ashwell v. Ashwell, 286 P.2d 983, 987 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1955) (“[I]n determining where custody of children shall lie the courts 
are not engaged in a disciplinary action to punish parents for their 
shortcomings as individuals . . . .”). 
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jurisdiction,63 which historically empowered the King to act as father 
to those unable to protect themselves—namely, “infants, idiots, and 
lunatics.”64 Children—like incapable adults—do not possess the 
faculties to make fully rational decisions or the power to implement 
those decisions, and for that reason need adults to intervene on their 
behalf.65 As an early scholar of equity argued when the jurisdiction to 
intervene in a custody dispute first came under assault, an argument 
echoed by the House of Lords in a foundational case upholding the 
jurisdiction,66 such a power simply must be assumed to exist in any 
civilized country.67  
The exceptional scope and power of family law’s best-interests 
inquiry, however, is grounded in more than children’s mere 
helplessness and incapacity. Child-custody jurisprudence, in discussing 
why children’s interests merit such special attention, explains that the 
state has a particular stake in children because children will become 
 
63. See, e.g., People ex rel. Ordronaux v. Chegaray, 18 Wend. 637, 643 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) (noting that the statute conferring on court the 
“power . . . of interfering between the husband and the wife in relation 
to the charge and custody of their minor children” was “suggested by” 
the English chancery practice of doing so on the basis of the “authority 
. . . said to belong to the king, as parens patriae, and . . . exercised by 
the chancellor as his representative”); Wellesley v. Wellesley, (1828) 4 
Eng. Rep. 1078 (H.L.) 1081 (finding jurisdiction because, under parens 
patriae, “it is the duty of the Crown to see that the child is properly 
taken care of”). 
64. Sarah Abramowicz, Note, English Child Custody Law, 1660–1839: The 
Origins of Judicial Intervention in Paternal Custody, 99 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1344, 1346 (1999).  
65. See De Manneville v. De Manneville, (1804) 32 Eng. Rep. 762 (Ch.) 767 
(“[O]f necessity the State must place somewhere a superintending power 
over those, who cannot take care of themselves.”). 
66. See Wellesley, 4 Eng. Rep. at 1084 (“[I]f your Lordships were to hold 
that there was not authority [to make orders with respect to the care of 
infants], you would do the greatest possible mischief to the 
country . . . .”). 
67. In defending Chancery’s jurisdiction to intervene in custody disputes, 
John Fonblanque argued:  
That in every civilized state, such a superintendence and 
protective power does somewhere exist, will scarcely be 
controverted. That if not found to exist elsewhere, it may be 
presumed to vest in the crown, will not, I think, be denied. 
Assuming, therefore, that the general superintendence of infants 
did originally vest in the crown, I shall conclude, that eâ ratione, 
it is now exercised in the court of Chancery as a branch of its 
general jurisdiction.  
John Fonblanque, A Treatise of Equity 229 n.a (London, J. & W.T. 
Clarke 5th ed. 1820) (1794). 
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participatory adult citizens.68 The assumption that underlies this 
claim—and the best-interests inquiry more generally—is that 
childhood is a formative stage. Children merit special protection not 
just because they are vulnerable, but because the conditions of their 
development will shape their future as adults. Childhood experience is 
important because it will help to determine the adult that each child 
will become. 
The premise of the best-interests inquiry—that children are shaped 
into their adult selves by their upbringing and early environment—is a 
notion that we take for granted today, but was relatively new at the time 
the best-interests standard first emerged in nineteenth-century American 
legal practice.69 The environmental theory of child development had its 
roots in the late seventeenth-century writings of John Locke, who 
argued that children enter the world as a blank slate and develop 
their understanding, capacities, and character through experience.70 
Locke’s emphasis on the importance of properly molding children into 
adults with desirable characteristics71 became increasingly influential 
over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.72 The best-
interests inquiry grew out of a new solicitude for children’s experience, 
on the theory that the way in which a child is brought up and 
educated can determine the child’s adult self.73  
 
68. See, e.g., Bishop v. Benear, 270 P. 569, 571 (Okla. 1928) (“These 
children in the future will be men and women, and citizens of this state, 
and their welfare and education and training along moral and religious 
lines is of interest to every citizen of the state.”). 
69. For a history of the emergence of the best-interests doctrine in 
nineteenth-century America, see Michael Grossberg, Governing 
the Hearth 234–85 (1985). 
70. See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
(Roger Woolhouse ed., Penguin Books 1997) (1690) (rejecting the notion 
that ideas are innate and arguing that they are instead acquired through 
experience); John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education 
§ 32 (John W. Yolton & Jean S. Yolton eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1989) 
(1693) [hereinafter Locke, Education] (“[T]he difference to be found 
in the Manners and Abilities of Men, is owing more to their Education 
than to anything else; we have reason to conclude, that great care is to 
be had of the forming Children’s Minds, and giving them that seasoning 
early, which shall influence their Lives always after.”). 
71. See Locke, Education, supra note 70, at § 217 (arguing that children 
are like “white Paper, or Wax” that can be “moulded” through the 
influences of early environment and education). 
72. See Jay Fliegelman, Prodigals and Pilgrims: The American 
Revolution Against Patriarchal Authority, 1750–1800, at 12–
29 (1982) (demonstrating the importance of Locke’s educational and 
developmental theories to early American thought). 
73. See Sarah Abramowicz, Childhood and the Limits of Contract, 21 Yale 
J.L. & Human. 37, 62–80 (2009) (tracing the influence of the 
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This developmentalist premise is reflected in the future-oriented 
aspect of contemporary child-custody decisions. Courts awarding 
custody try to alleviate children’s immediate pain and suffering. But 
they take for granted that their goal is to find the caregiving 
environment most likely to give each child the best possible 
adulthood.74 Judges making custody decisions often express anxiety 
about the responsibility of making, on a child’s behalf, a decision that 
will shape the child’s adult life.75 Heightening the anxiety of making 
such an important decision is the difficult nature of the best-interests 
analysis, which courts have described as requiring them to predict the 
future by assessing the type of adulthood that one or another 
custodial situation is likely to create for a child.76 
B. The Developmentalist Insights of the Best-Interests Analysis 
The best-interests analysis of child custody law is focused—as is 
no other area of law—on the connection between childhood experience 
and the adult self. In assessing which custodial outcome is best for a 
child, family-law courts often engage in a nuanced examination of 
every aspect of a child’s early experience that might have bearing 
upon the child’s future. Custody case law therefore offers a 
perspective unique in legal analysis on the various factors that shape 
children’s development. 
In looking to children’s future well-being, custody courts often 
articulate their goal in attending to the developmental process. While 
courts differ in how they frame this goal, it typically involves 
producing a well-adjusted and happy adult. Courts seek, in particular, 
 
environmental theory of child development on early best-interests 
jurisprudence). 
74. See, e.g., Harmon v. Emerson, 425 A.2d 978, 983 (Me. 1981) (“The 
court’s decision may have a crucial and potentially long-term impact on 
the physical and psychological well-being and potential future 
development of the child at a time in its life when its future as a 
balanced, healthy and happy individual is most clearly at stake.”). 
75. See, e.g., id. at 982–83 (“The issue of child custody is among the most 
sensitive and vital questions that courts decide.”); Prost v. Greene, 652 
A.2d 621, 633–34 (D.C. 1995) (Schwelb, J., concurring) (“[I]n this kind 
of case, . . . the future of the children is in the balance . . . .”); In re 
Minors of Luck, 10 Ohio Dec. 1, 2 (Prob. Ct. 1899) (“The destiny and 
future usefulness and prosperity of a child, possessed of infinite 
possibilities, is to be affected in no small degree by the judgment of the 
court.”). 
76. See, e.g., In re C.B., 618 N.E.2d 598, 603 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) 
(“[D]eciding what is in a child’s best interest is difficult, if not 
impossible to predict without a crystal ball or the gift of foresight.”). 
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to foster what they may term “independen[ce],”77 “self-sufficien[cy],”78 
or “productiv[ity]”79—in short, the “autonomy” that is the hallmark 
of adulthood.80 The overarching goal of the best-interests analysis is 
to ensure that children acquire the emotional, psychological, cognitive, 
and educational tools necessary to leave the dependency of childhood 
behind and to function in the world as competent adults.81 
In some cases, courts have the luxury of deciding between two 
relatively beneficial alternatives. Parents disputing custody may offer 
extended evidence of the excellent schools, enriching extracurricular 
activities, and nurturing family environment that each parent can 
provide for the child.82 Where each parent is well situated and 
psychologically healthy, and the child is equally attached to both, a 
court may base its decision on the marginal advantages offered by one 
parent over another, such as worldwide travel, better parenting skills, 
or superior educational opportunities.83 
More typically, judges face custody situations that will likely 
inflict some degree of harm on a child. Some of these harms are 
incident to the dispute itself and the changes in a child’s life that it 
entails. The parental conflict that gave rise to the custody dispute 
 
77. Prost, 652 A.2d at 625 (finding that “regular interaction with both 
parents [is] important to [children’s] development into independent, 
well-rounded, confident adults” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
78. Saplansky v. Saplansky, 19 Phila. Cnty. Rptr. 29, 42–43 (Pa. Ct. Com. 
Pl. 1989) (selecting the custody arrangement most likely to render child 
“relatively self-sufficient later in life”). 
79. Herrera v. Herrera, 944 S.W.2d 379, 386 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (“The 
true test for the award of custody is to arrive at the point of deciding 
with whom to place the child in preparation for a caring and productive 
adult life.”). 
80. See, e.g., Harris v. Harris, No. FA 940543256, 1997 WL 710437, at *11 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 1997) (discussing how to foster child’s future 
“autonomy”). 
81. See id. (“To achieve trust, autonomy, initiative, and industry children 
need to be securely attached emotionally so that they can take on the 
risks implicit in growing up. At the same time, they need to be 
challenged by goals that are worth pursuing. Children who are fortunate 
to experience such contexts are likely to enjoy their lives, while at the 
same time contributing to the common good.” (quoting Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi, Contexts of Optimal Growth in Childhood, 122 
Dædalus: J Am. Acad. Arts & Sci. 31, 44 (1993))). 
82. See, e.g., Berg v. Berg, 490 N.W.2d 487, 491 (N.D. 1992) (comparing 
the potential benefits that each of two loving and fit parents could 
provide to their children). 
83. See id. at 490 (affirming trial court’s award of custody to the parent 
whose superior ability to expose the children to new experiences 
rendered her more likely to help them become “better prepared for 
independent life, as adults”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012 
Beyond Family Law 
314 
may put a child’s development at risk, as may the necessity of 
separating children from one of their parents. Judges making custody 
decisions also discuss a number of possible developmental harms that 
are present in intact families as well, such as financial problems, 
suboptimal parenting, or the disruptions caused by relocation. 
Custody decisions therefore offer a wide-ranging picture of possible 
harms to a child’s development, with a particular focus on harms that 
may diminish the likelihood that a child will become a healthy, 
productive, and autonomous adult.  
The custody literature reflects a consensus that disruption of a 
child’s environment can inflict significant harm on the child’s 
development. Custody jurisprudence advocates providing children 
with as much continuity and stability as is consistent with avoiding 
other harms.84 Within the general mandate to minimize disruptions to 
children, the foremost change that custody courts seek to avoid is 
disruption of a child’s tie to a parent or caretaker. Custody courts 
since the nineteenth century have looked to protect the “ties of 
affection” between children and their caregivers.85 Today, custody 
courts routinely observe that children separated from their parents 
can suffer life-long harm to their emotional, social, and cognitive 
development.86 A court awarding custody will often cite psychological 
studies and expert testimony detailing the risk to children of 
 
84. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.23 (2012) (instructing judges 
awarding custody to consider, inter alia, the “desirability of maintaining 
continuity” in a child’s environment and caretaking arrangements, and 
to weigh this against factors such as the child’s potential exposure to 
domestic violence); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 466 A.2d 937, 938 (N.H. 1983) 
(acknowledging a “correlation between the stability of family 
relationships and the healthy psychological development of children”). 
85. See The Queen v. Gyngall, [1893] 2 Q.B. 232 at 244 (refusing to remove 
child from caregiver where this would constitute “a very serious 
dislocation of an existing tie”). The importance of protecting children’s 
“ties of affection” to their psychological parent figure was influentially 
set forth in the English case of Gyngall, 2 Q.B. at 243, which was then 
widely cited by American custody courts. See, e.g., Finlay v. Finlay, 148 
N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925) (Cardozo, J.) (citing Gyngall on the 
importance to children’s welfare of the ties of affection).  
86. See, e.g., Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 493 (Cal. 1986) (“We have 
frequently stressed . . . the importance of stability and continuity in the 
life of a child, and the harm that may result from disruption of 
established patterns of care and emotional bonds.”). The developmental 
harm that children stand to suffer when separated from a primary 
parent figure was detailed by Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert 
J. Solnit in their 1973 work Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, 
which has been widely influential in child-custody jurisprudence. See 
Joseph Goldstein et al., Beyond the Best Interests of the 
Child (1973). 
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separation from a parent at a given developmental stage.87 Courts are 
especially wary of separating an infant or toddler from a primary 
caregiver, on the basis that children who undergo such a separation 
often have trouble regulating their emotions and forming relationships 
later in life, and may also suffer deficits in language acquisition and 
other cognitive skills.88 
In recent years, courts and legislatures have increasingly insisted 
on the importance to children’s development of maintaining ties with 
both parents.89 A number of state custody statutes specify that courts 
should take into account a child’s developmental stage, and the 
related need for contact with both parents, when arranging parenting 
plans or visiting schedules90 or when assessing whether the primary 
caretaker should be permitted to relocate.91 Custody courts may 
 
87. See, e.g., In re S.J., 846 N.E.2d 633, 636 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (citing 
research indicating that when a two-year-old’s relationship “with a 
primary caregiver is disrupted, the young child can develop trust issues 
that may inhibit development of his own personality and his ability to 
form relationships”); see also, e.g., In re Luis, 847 N.Y.S.2d 835, 846–47 
(Fam. Ct. 2007) (discussing importance of toddler stage to child’s future 
emotional and intellectual development, and noting that changes in 
family arrangements during this stage “can alter the developmental 
course for children in a major way”).  
88. See, e.g., In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 21 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) 
(“Countless psychological and child development studies have shown 
that children—especially infants and young children under the age of 
five—who are needlessly separated from their familiar parent suffer 
resulting deficits in their emotional and intellectual development.”). 
89. See, e.g., Luis, 847 N.Y.S.2d at 846–47 (discussing the potential harm 
that could result from disrupting the father-child bond between the ages 
of eighteen and thirty-six months); Mark L. v. Gail S., N.Y. L.J., May 
30, 2006, at 25 (Nassau Cnty. Sup. Ct.) (observing that mother’s 
limitation of children’s contact with father created risk of “personality 
disorder features and pathological interpersonal relationships in the 
future”). For an early work advocating protection of children’s ties to 
their secondary as well as primary caretakers, see David L. Chambers, 
Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 
Mich. L. Rev. 477, 533–35 (1984). 
90. See, e.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 650 (2010) (“[I]t is in the best 
interests of [a] minor child to have the opportunity for maximum 
continuing physical and emotional contact with both parents, unless 
direct physical harm or significant emotional harm to the child or a 
parent is likely to result from such contact.”); see also Cummings v. 
Cummings, No. M2003-00086-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2346000, at *9 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2004) (“[T]he child’s developmental level is a 
very important consideration in fashioning a parenting arrangement.”). 
91. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann § 61.13001 (West Supp. 2012) (instructing 
court ruling on parent’s relocation request to consider “[t]he age and 
developmental stage of the child . . . and the likely impact the relocation 
will have on the child’s . . . emotional development” and on the child’s 
relationship with the non-relocating parent); Sylvester v. Sylvester, 992 
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insist, for instance, that children under the age of five maintain 
weekly contact with both parents, on the basis that younger children 
do not have a well-developed sense of time and therefore need 
frequent contact with both parents in order to bond with them, as 
well as that even a two-week separation from a parent could inflict 
trauma on a very young child.92 
Courts assessing children’s interests also recognize a number of 
other forms of instability that can impair children’s development. 
Foremost among these is the instability created by a parent’s financial 
distress. Although some jurisdictions prohibit custody courts from 
considering a parent’s financial situation in awarding custody,93 others 
allow94 or even require95 such consideration. Courts recognize, albeit 
reluctantly, that financial deprivation and its attendant harms—
including frequent moves, foreclosures, material deprivation, and 
parental stress—can undermine a parent’s ability to provide children 
with a sufficiently safe and stable environment for them to prosper 
and thrive as they develop into adults.96  
 
So. 2d 296, 296–97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (delaying parent’s 
relocation until child reached five years of age). 
92. See, e.g., Cummings, 2004 WL 2346000, at *9 (explaining reversal of 
trial court’s order alternating six-month custodial periods with each 
parent). 
93. See, e.g., Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 491 (Cal. 1986) (en banc) 
(“[C]omparative income or economic advantage is not a permissible 
basis for a custody award.”). 
94. See, e.g., P.A. v. A.H.O., 757 N.W.2d 58, 62–63 (N.D. 2008) (finding 
parents’ relative income levels a permissible factor in the best interests 
analysis). 
95. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.23(c) (West 2011) (directing 
custody court to consider “[t]he capacity and disposition of the parties 
involved to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care . . . , and 
other material needs”); see also, e.g., Bjorkland v. Eastman, 719 
N.Y.S.2d 744, 747 (App. Div. 2001) (“Courts must weigh many factors 
when making custody decisions, and the respective financial situations of 
the parties is one such factor to be weighed with others.” (citation 
omitted)). But see Dempsey v. Dempsey, 296 N.W.2d 813, 813 (Mich. 
1980) (per curiam) (holding that courts assessing the statutory best 
interests factors should not place undue weight on parties’ economic 
circumstances).  
96. See, e.g., Secada v. Secada, No. FA990174204S, 2002 WL 1041726, at 
*11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2002) (finding that the financial 
insecurity of the parent would “inevitably affect and harm the 
children”); Housand v. Housand, 509 S.E.2d 827, 830 (S.C. Ct. App. 
1998) (recognizing potential developmental harms that accompany 
financial deprivation); Fanning v. Fanning, 717 P.2d 346, 353 (Wyo. 
1986) (“We believe that best interest is attendant with educational 
opportunity and stable environment for which economic resources are 
not insignificant.”). 
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A related harm that custody courts seek to avoid is disruption of 
a child’s established custodial environment. The best-interests 
assessment frequently details the developmental damage that children 
can suffer when they are forced to leave their home, school, or 
network of family and friends. Each of these disruptions, courts note, 
can thwart a child’s educational and social progress.97 A court may for 
this reason refuse to allow the custodial parent to relocate, even when 
the relocation would otherwise benefit the parent and child, for 
instance by providing the parent with a more desirable job.98  
The best-interests standard therefore provides a primer on how 
various aspects of a child’s environment can influence the likelihood 
that the child will develop into a functional and autonomous adult. 
Best-interests jurisprudence holds that children’s development suffers 
above all when a child is separated from a parent. Children’s 
development is also threatened whenever a parent’s situation is 
disrupted to an extent that the child lives the consequences. Where a 
parent suffers from job loss, foreclosure, forced relocation, or a decline 
in material well-being, the child suffers as well. When a child’s 
environment is disrupted, the child can experience more than 
transient discomfort. A sufficient disruption can derail a child’s 
intellectual, emotional, and educational development, diminishing the 
likelihood that the child will become the well-regulated, capable, and 
productive adult that custody decisions hope to produce. 
C. Implications 
The best-interests assessment of child-custody law brings out the 
extent to which—in every family, including the majority of families 
that never come before a custody court—children are formed by 
conditions beyond their control. Judges attend to child development 
primarily in the context of custody disputes. In most other instances, 
children are delegated to their parents’ care, and no further attention 
is paid to how they are raised. The family is in most cases a black box 
that the law declines to peer inside. When judges assess children’s 
interests in custody disputes, they shed light on what goes on in 
families generally. In lifting the lid off the black box of the family, 
these cases demonstrate the extent to which children at once have no 
control over their upbringing and are largely determined by it.  
 
97. See, e.g., Dow v. Dow, 761 N.Y.S.2d 682, 683 (App. Div. 2003) 
(attributing child’s educational difficulties and behavioral problems to 
mother’s frequent moves). 
98. See, e.g., Cohn v. Cohn, 658 So. 2d 479, 481 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) 
(denying mother’s relocation request on the basis that “removing the 
children from their current surroundings and environment at this time 
was not in their best interests” given the potential consequences “on the 
children’s educational, cultural, and social needs”). 
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Child-custody case law thus raises the question of whether the law 
should do more than it currently does to facilitate those factors of 
family life—such as child-parent contact, stability, and financial well-
being—that, according to the best-interests literature, are most likely 
to affect a child’s chances of becoming an autonomous, productive, 
and psychologically healthy adult. The primary reason the law does 
not get involved in the workings of the intact family is that judicial 
intervention would diminish parental autonomy, a fundamental right 
necessary to the flourishing of a pluralistic, democratic society with a 
diverse citizenry.99 But what about situations where the law could 
work alongside parents to strengthen their ability to provide their 
children with optimal conditions of development, in a manner that 
does not interfere with—and in fact fosters—parental autonomy?  
Family-law scholars currently debate the extent to which it is 
possible for the government to help parents carry out their task of 
child rearing without impinging on parents’ autonomy, for instance by 
subsidizing day care or education.100 This Article takes a different 
approach. Instead of considering the ways in which the law could 
more actively foster optimal conditions of child development, the 
Article asks instead that we consider inflicting less harm on children 
than we currently do. For there are a number of legal cases that have 
nothing to do with children directly, but where courts, in passing 
judgment on children’s parents, reshape families and family 
circumstances in ways that harm children’s development. What would 
it look like to assess these cases in light of the robust perspective on 
children’s interests and child development articulated by courts 
deciding custody disputes?  
II. Beyond Family Law: Cases Affecting Children 
Indirectly 
Within the context of family law, courts and commentators faced 
with the problem of how to resolve custody disputes articulate at 
length how children are affected by the circumstances of their parents’ 
lives. When a child stands to be separated from a parent figure, 
 
99. See Dailey, supra note 58, at 1022 (“In the United States, the process of 
becoming a self-governing individual capable of meaningful political 
participation takes place initially and primarily within the family. . . . 
Our liberal democracy rejects the conformity resulting from direct state 
indoctrination; instead it requires intermediate institutions to initiate 
individuals into the political life of the state.”). 
100. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 12, at 307 (advocating an approach that 
“allows the caretaker-dependent unit to flourish, supported and 
subsidized by the larger society without the imposition of conformity”); 
McClain, supra note 11, at 90 (arguing that “both governmental action 
and restraint are necessary to help families engage in nurturing the 
capacities of family members”). 
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exposed to financial instability or deprivation, or subjected to a 
disruptive change in environment, courts assessing children’s interests 
routinely act to prevent such outcomes in the name of protecting 
children from developmental harm. 
Across the rest of the legal canon, attention to children’s interests 
is significantly more limited. Courts may attend to children when 
they are parties to a case, or when they are directly involved, for 
instance as the victim of a crime. There is very little attention to 
children, however, in the great majority of situations where they are 
affected by cases involving their parents.  
This Part will discuss two areas of law in which children are 
potentially affected by cases involving their parents: criminal law and 
contract law. From the perspective of family law’s best-interests 
jurisprudence, we can see that children’s development can be affected, 
often profoundly, by cases involving their parents in both fields. As 
we will see, however, criminal law gives only limited consideration to 
children’s interests in such cases, and contract law often fails to 
address the matter altogether.  
While criminal law scholars have long puzzled over whether to 
consider children in cases involving their parents, they have done so 
from the limited perspective of their own doctrinal field, and thus 
have failed to recognize the full theoretical import of whether to 
attend to children’s interests in such cases. In contract law, scholars 
have attended to children’s interests only with respect to contracts 
that redefine the family, and have largely overlooked the ways in 
which children are affected by other parental contracts. Scholars in 
both criminal law and contract law have thus missed an opportunity 
to consider the connection between children’s interests and the 
underlying goals and premises of their respective fields. 
A. Criminal Law 
Perhaps the area of law that most dramatically illustrates the 
collateral consequences for children of cases involving their parents is 
criminal law. Children are potentially affected by many aspects of 
criminal cases involving their parents. For instance, the very 
definition of what is and is not a criminal offense can affect a 
defendant’s child, sometimes in a protective way, as where the law 
criminalizes acts of violence against the child.101 Indeed, the law can 
often reshape families for the better, as it does in criminalizing 
domestic violence.102 
 
101. See, e.g., W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-8D (LexisNexis 2010) (criminalizing 
acts of violence against child by a parent, guardian, or custodian). 
102. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 12.55.155(c)(18)(C) (2012) (providing for 
sentence enhancement where domestic violence committed in the 
presence of a child living with victim or perpetrator). 
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But children’s interests are also at stake when their parents are 
convicted of crimes unrelated to the children. And here, unlike in the 
child abuse or domestic violence context, the child is not at the 
forefront of the court’s analysis. Nonetheless, children may well be 
deeply affected by the outcome of such a case. Children are especially 
likely to be affected by a criminal case involving a parent where the 
parent faces incarceration. This Section will therefore focus on the 
effects of parental incarceration on minor children, and the extent to 
which the existing sentencing regime takes these effects into account 
when sentencing parents. 
1. Effect of Parental Incarceration on Children 
Family law’s best-interests analysis helps to bring out the extent of 
developmental damage that parental incarceration can inflict on a 
child. As we have seen, best-interests jurisprudence holds up separation 
of parent and child as particularly harmful to a child’s development. A 
child whose parent is incarcerated endures an extreme form of such 
separation. Many children see their incarcerated parents rarely or not 
at all: in 2007, nearly fifty percent of both incarcerated mothers and 
incarcerated fathers had no visits with their minor children,103 and 
many incarcerated parents had no form of contact with their 
children.104 Prisons are often located far from the communities in which 
prisoners resided prior to their incarceration, which, in combination 
with limited visiting hours and other prison policies, can make 
visitation pragmatically difficult or prohibitively expensive for children 
and their caretakers.105  
This form of extreme separation from a parent can thwart the 
bonding process between a parent and a young child, leading to the 
attachment problems that family-law courts try to prevent when they 
 
103. See Lauren E. Glaze & Laura M. Maruschak, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report: Parents 
in Prison and Their Minor Children 18 app. tbl. 10 (rev. 2010). 
104. See id. 
105. See Chesa Boudin, Children of Incarcerated Parents: The Child’s 
Constitutional Right to the Family Relationship, 101 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 77, 99–104 (2011) (describing aspects of prison policies 
that make visitation of parents difficult for children and their 
caretakers); Myrna S. Raeder, Gender-Related Issues in a Post-Booker 
Federal Guidelines World, 37 McGeorge L. Rev. 691, 745–46 (2006) 
(noting that because of the limited number of federal prisons for women, 
mothers convicted of federal crimes are especially likely to be 
incarcerated far away from their children); Philip M. Genty, Damage to 
Family Relationships as a Collateral Consequence of Parental 
Incarceration, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1671, 1675 (2003) (analyzing 
data suggesting that parental incarceration limits parent-child contact 
to an extent that inflicts “long-lasting . . . [damage] upon the parent-
child relationship”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012 
Beyond Family Law 
321 
insist on frequent contact between parents and children in the infancy 
and toddler stage.106 Disruption of an existing bond between parent and 
child is also potentially damaging. For children under the age of five, 
both lack of parent-child bonding and disruption of an existing bond 
can create difficulties in cognitive and language development as well as 
in forming relationships and regulating emotions later in life.107 Older 
children separated from their parents suffer developmental harm as 
well, often in the form of behavioral and educational difficulties.108 
The damage inflicted on a child by separation from the 
incarcerated parent is often compounded by the financial and other 
difficulties that parental incarceration tends to create.109 If the parent 
contributed to the household finances or to household labor, the loss 
of that contribution through incarceration will diminish the child’s 
material well-being.110 As custody courts acknowledge, a decline in a 
child’s socio-economic circumstances can reduce the likelihood that 
the child will flourish.111 Where a parent is imprisoned, the child’s 
remaining caretaker is often forced to take on new employment or to 
move to more affordable housing, sometimes including homeless 
shelters. As a result, the child is subjected to disruptions in education, 
home life, and environment, as well as to the anxiety and diminished 
availability of an overburdened caretaker.112 We know from family 
 
106. See supra text accompanying notes 83–92. 
107. See supra text accompanying notes 83–92. 
108. See supra text accompanying notes 83–92. 
109. See Joyce A. Arditti, Jennifer Lambert-Shute & Karen Joest, Saturday 
Morning at the Jail: Implications of Incarceration for Families and 
Children, 52 Fam. Rel. 195, 201–02 (2003) (summarizing study finding 
that incarceration inflicts myriad harms on inmates’ families, including 
financial loss, emotional stress, declining health, and social stigma, and 
concluding that “[w]e believe that incarceration pushes many families 
over, ripening conditions related to rotten outcomes for family life and 
child development” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
110. See id. at 199–200 (describing multiple factors contributing to decline in 
financial well-being of families in which a member has been incarcerated, 
including loss of income from the incarcerated parent, increased 
likelihood that the remaining parent will leave paid work in order to 
care for the children, and the expenses associated with incarceration). 
111. See supra text accompanying notes 83–86. 
112. See Nell Bernstein, All Alone in the World: Children of the 
Incarcerated 117–20 (2005) (detailing the pervasive disruptions in the 
life of the child of an incarcerated parent); Donald Braman, Doing 
Time on the Outside (2004) (employing ethnographic methodology to 
document the damage incarceration inflicts on family structure and on 
the material well-being of offenders’ families and communities); Arditti 
et al., supra note 109, at 200 (describing parenting strain, difficulty 
coping, and sense of isolation experienced by family members of 
incarcerated parents). 
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law’s best-interests jurisprudence that each of these factors can harm 
a child’s emotional, cognitive, and educational progress to a 
significant degree.113  
Despite the myriad harms that incarceration of a parent inflicts 
on a child, those children who are able to reside with a remaining 
parent are the relatively fortunate ones. When a single parent is 
incarcerated, the child may be placed with relatives—often 
grandparents—or family friends who struggle to cope with caring for 
the child and as a result may move the child from one household to 
another.114 Here children suffer repeated instances of the instability 
and disruption that family law presents as destructive to a child’s 
development.115 A number of children, moreover, are placed in foster 
care as a result of parental incarceration, or are have been placed in 
foster care shortly before their parent’s arrest.116 Children in foster 
care are frequently moved from one placement to the next,117 and 
often suffer abuse and neglect.118 Under the Adoption and Safe 
Families Act, parental rights must be terminated where a child is in 
foster care for more than fifteen months of any twenty-two month 
period, unless certain limited exceptions apply.119 Where parental 
 
113. See supra text accompanying note 86. 
114. See Bernstein, supra note 112, at 109–42 (describing financial and 
practical struggles of grandparents caring for children of incarcerated 
parents). 
115. See, e.g., Goldstein et al., supra note 86, at 32–33 (observing that 
when children’s ties to their parents or caretakers are interrupted 
repeatedly, children “tend to grow up as persons who lack warmth in 
their contact with fellow beings”). 
116. See Timothy Ross, Ajay Khashu, & Mark Wamsley, Vera Inst. 
of Justice, Hard Data on Hard Times: An Empirical Analysis 
of Maternal Incarceration, Foster Care, and Visitation (2004) 
(presenting study of incarcerated mothers showing that while some 
children are placed in foster care as the result of a mother’s arrest, in 
the majority of cases, a child’s placement in foster care precedes the 
mother’s arrest, and theorizing that the child’s removal tends to make 
arrest more likely by accelerating the mother’s downward spiral).  
117. See Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and 
Failure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 Minn. L. 
Rev. 637, 653–54 (1999) (noting that children in foster care tend to 
experience multiple placements).  
118. See generally Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for 
Constitutional Protection of Foster Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 199 (1988) (describing abuse and neglect 
experienced by children in foster care). 
119. See Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 675(5)(E) (2006). 
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rights are thus terminated, the tie between parent and child is severed 
altogether as a result of incarceration.120  
Family law’s best-interests jurisprudence helps demonstrate the 
myriad ways in which parental incarceration can harm children’s 
development. Separation of child from parent, lack of parent-child 
contact, financial instability, and disruption of a child’s 
environment—all likely results of parental incarceration—each 
threaten children’s well-being and developmental progress. When 
these factors are compounded, as they so often are when a parent is 
imprisoned, family law tells us that the effect is to diminish the 
likelihood that the child will become an autonomous, productive, and 
emotionally healthy adult. 
2. Current Judicial Approaches 
Criminal law is one of the few areas of law outside of family law 
that will on occasion take children’s interests into account in cases 
involving their parents, and it does so primarily in the context of 
sentencing. A number of jurisdictions provide for some consideration of 
children’s interests when sentencing parents. Given the significance of 
parental incarceration for children, this is not surprising. Even within 
criminal-sentencing law, however, consideration of children’s interests in 
cases involving parents is often limited or prohibited altogether. 
Beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, the federal government and the 
majority of states moved from a flexible sentencing system in which 
judges could consider a number of factors to a more tightly regulated 
one in which judicial discretion was significantly constrained.121 At the 
federal level, this shift occurred with the adoption of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines in 1987,122 which apply in conjunction with 
independently enacted statutory mandatory minimums for certain 
offenses.123 Many states adopted their own statutory guidelines to 
 
120. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic 
Punishment of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1474, 1498–99 (2012) 
(discussing how ASFA interacts with maternal incarceration to 
accelerate the termination of maternal rights, and analyzing the 
systemic harm inflicted on black mothers and their children by the 
intersection of the foster care and maternal incarceration); Genty, supra 
note 105, at 1677 (“ASFA has likely had a disproportionate impact 
upon incarcerated parents with children in foster care.”). 
121. See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, Other States, 
and the Federal Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 Fed. Sent’g 
Rep. 69, 72 (1999) (discussing the consensus that emerged in the 1970s 
that judicial discretion in sentencing should be reduced). 
122. See id. at 70. 
123. See Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 Cardozo 
L. Rev. 1, 8–9 (2010) (describing history and proliferation of federal 
mandatory minimums, which are enacted by statute and “set the lower 
limits for sentencing particular offenses and particular offenders”); see 
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limit judicial discretion at sentencing124 or achieved similar results 
through rules such as mandatory minimums and habitual offender 
laws.125 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines greatly limit the situations in 
which courts can take children’s interests into account when 
sentencing parents. Under the Guidelines, “family ties”—including 
those between parent and child—are “not ordinarily relevant” at 
sentencing.126 According to commentary added to the Guidelines in 
2003, this means that courts following the Guidelines can only take 
children’s interests into account when they stand to suffer a degree of 
harm that “substantially exceeds” the harm that a child would 
“ordinarily” suffer upon a parent’s incarceration.127 This, in turn, 
requires, at a minimum, that the incarceration will result in a “loss of 
essential caretaking” to the child, such that no viable caretaker can be 
found to take the parent’s place.128 
Some courts interpreting the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have 
found that the harm facing a child is not sufficiently extraordinary to 
merit consideration even where the child stands to enter foster care as 
a result of the parent’s incarceration,129 or where the offender who 
 
generally U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Report to Congress: 
Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice 
System (2011) (providing overview of federal mandatory minimums, 
including their history and their interaction with the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines). 
124. See Frase, supra note 121, at 72.  
125. See John F. Pfaff, The Continued Vitality of Structured Sentencing 
Following Blakeley: The Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54 
UCLA L. Rev. 235, 242 (2006) (identifying mandatory minimums and 
habitual offender laws as among the sentencing reforms that gained 
popularity in the 1970s); Michael Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects 
of Mandatory Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent Findings, 38 
Crime & Just. 65, 75 (2009) (“Between 1975 and 1996, mandatory 
minimums were America’s most frequently enacted sentencing law 
changes. . . . By 1994, every state had adopted mandatory penalties; 
most had several.” (citation omitted)). 
126. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H1.6 (2011). 
127. Id. § 5H1.6 cmt. 1(B)(ii). 
128. Id. § 5H1.6 cmt. 1(B)(i), (iii).  
129. See, e.g., United States v. Leandre, 132 F.3d 796, 807–08 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (upholding district court’s denial of departure for single father 
whose children faced foster care); United States v. Brand, 907 F.2d 31, 
33 (4th Cir. 1990) (“A sole, custodial parent is not a rarity in today’s 
society, and imprisoning such a parent will by definition separate the 
parent from the children. It is apparent that in many cases the other 
parent may be unwilling or unable to care for the children, and that the 
children will have to live with relatives, friends, or even in foster 
homes.”). 
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faces incarceration is a single parent with several children, including 
an infant.130 These courts require medical problems or other special 
circumstances before a child’s interests can be taken into account 
when sentencing parents.131 Other courts have interpreted the 
Guidelines to permit consideration of children’s interests in a wider 
set of circumstances, for instance where the child will be losing a 
single parent or a primary caretaker.132 
Many states have taken a similar approach, either by statute or 
through case law. A number of states follow an “excessive hardship” 
standard comparable to that of the federal guidelines.133 Other states 
require courts to focus on the wrongfulness of defendants’ conduct 
rather than on harm to their families, and thus forbid consideration of 
a defendant’s children altogether unless relevant to the egregiousness 
of their parent’s criminal conduct.134 Some states, by contrast, allow 
children’s interests to be considered more broadly when sentencing 
parents.135 As in the federal system, state sentencing regimes often 
impose an additional restriction on judicial discretion in the form of 
mandatory minimums that apply to particular offenses or offenders.136   
130. See, e.g., United States v. Dyce, 91 F.3d 1462, 1466–67 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(finding family circumstances not sufficiently extraordinary to warrant a 
downward departure for single mother of three children under the age of 
four, including an infant of three months who was still being breast-fed). 
131. See, e.g., United States v. Roselli, 366 F.3d 58, 62–63, 70 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(finding downward departure warranted where defendant’s two young 
children required extensive caretaking for cystic fibrosis, and his wife 
was herself unwell and unable to care for them); United States v. 
Spedden, 917 F. Supp. 404, 406–07, 409 (E.D. Va. 1996) (departing 
downward where wife suffered from cancer and daughter from a 
potentially fatal illness, while noting that “[t]he Fourth Circuit has 
construed downward departures based on family ties very narrowly”). 
132. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(upholding downward departure on basis of single parent status). 
133. See, e.g., 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/5-5-3.1(a)(11) (West 2007) 
(requiring “excessive hardship” for child’s interests to be taken into 
account); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-1(b)(11) (West 2005) (same); 
People v. Pearson, 462 N.W.2d 839, 843 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) 
(requiring “exceptional circumstances”). 
134. See, e.g., Rafferty v. State, 799 So. 2d 243, 248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2001) (reversing as inappropriate downward departure that was given 
on basis that defendant’s child needed financial support); State v. Amo, 
882 P.2d 1188, 1191 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (“The birth of [defendant’s] 
son while she was in custody does not make the commission of her three 
crimes any less offensive.”). 
135. See, e.g., State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) (interpreting 
sentencing guidelines to permit consideration of children’s interests in 
determining whether to suspend a parent’s sentence). 
136. See Tonry, supra note 125, at 75 (describing the proliferation of 
mandatory minimums in the states between the 1970s and the 1990s). 
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At both the federal level and in many states, guidelines-imposed 
limits on considering children’s interests when sentencing parents 
have recently been brought into question by the Supreme Court’s 
2005 decision in United States v. Booker, which rendered the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines merely advisory, on the ground that imposing 
mandatory sentences on the basis of judge-found facts violates the 
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.137 Under Booker, federal 
courts must still calculate the Guidelines sentence, but are free to 
depart from it.138 The Booker decision also brought into question the 
validity of many state sentencing regimes.139  
Federal courts were initially uncertain about the extent to which 
Booker left courts free to exercise discretion in imposing criminal 
sentences.140 One area of uncertainty was the degree to which courts 
could reject policies embedded in the Sentencing Guidelines, including 
the limitation on taking children’s interests into account when 
sentencing parents.141 Left with the option of following the Guidelines 
and the possibility of reversal if they did not, many courts continued 
to follow the Guidelines rule that children’s interests are not relevant 
unless incarceration would result in the loss of an irreplaceable 
caretaker and in so doing inflict substantially greater harm than 
ordinarily suffered by the child of an incarcerated parent.142 Given 
that, as we have seen, most children of incarcerated parents stand to 
suffer a fair degree of harm,143 this rule significantly limits 
consideration of children’s interests when sentencing parents. 
In the years following Booker, however, the Supreme Court has 
made increasingly clear the extent to which the Guidelines are now 
truly advisory. In Gall v. United States, the Court held that a 
 
137. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226, 245 (2005). 
138. Id. at 259–60. 
139. See Stephanos Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth Amendment and 
Criminal Sentencing, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 775, 785–88 (2008) 
(discussing effect of Booker on state approaches to sentencing). 
140. See Robert J. Anello & Jodi Misher Peikin, Evolving Roles in Federal 
Sentencing: The Post-Booker/Fanfan World, 1 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 301, 
331–32 (2006) (describing the uncertainty wrought by Booker).  
141. Compare United States v. Menyweather, 447 F.3d 625, 634 (9th Cir. 
2006) (finding that Booker allows sentencing courts greater leeway to 
take into account family ties), with United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 
594 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding that even after Booker, sentencing courts 
are still largely constrained by the Guidelines, and can only significantly 
depart to take into account family ties when faced with “dramatic 
facts”).  
142. See Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A 
First Look, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 18 (2010) (finding that many post-
Booker judges continued to sentence within the Guidelines). 
143. See supra Part II.A.1. 
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sentencing court can depart significantly from the Guidelines even in 
the absence of extraordinary circumstances.144 In the companion case 
of Kimbrough v. United States, the Court further clarified that district 
courts may now reject a Guidelines sentence on the basis of a 
disagreement with the policy that underlies the Guidelines 
approach.145 This line of cases opens up the possibility that federal 
sentencing courts may revisit their hesitant approach to considering 
children’s interests when sentencing parents. 
In the wake of Booker and its progeny, both the federal 
government and the states are newly debating how to reframe their 
approaches to sentencing.146 Added pressure to revisit criminal 
sentencing has come from a need to reduce the prison population, for 
both financial147 and constitutional reasons.148 An issue this debate 
must confront is whether and to what extent courts should be allowed 
to take children’s interests into account when sentencing a parent. 
Now is thus a critical time to revisit the rationales for and against 
considering children’s interests when incarcerating their parents. 
3. Current Debates About Considering Children  
When Sentencing Parents 
As sentencing expert Douglas Berman has noted, while the 
literature “makes quite compelling the social policy reasons for” taking 
children’s interests into account when sentencing parents,149 the 
criminal-justice rationale for doing so has been undertheorized.150 
 
144. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47 (2007). 
145. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 100 (2007) (upholding 
rejection of Guidelines sentence on the basis of district court’s 
disagreement with the Guidelines policy implementing a 100:1 ratio for 
sentences involving crack versus powder cocaine). For an extended 
analysis of the implications of Booker, Gall, and Kimbrough for 
consideration of parental status at sentencing, see Sarah Abramowicz, 
Rethinking Parental Incarceration, 82 U. Colo. L. Rev. 793, 823–29 
(2011). 
146. See, e.g., Symposium, Judicial Discretion: A Look Forward and a Look 
Back Five Years After Booker, 22 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 297 (2010). 
147. See Jennifer Steinhauer, To Trim Costs, States Relax Hard Line on 
Prisons, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 2009, at Al (describing actions taken by 
a number of states to reduce their prison populations in order to control 
mounting prison costs).  
148. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (directing California to 
reduce its prison population in order to address prison overcrowding 
that created conditions violating the Eighth Amendment prohibition on 
cruel and unusual punishment). 
149. Douglas A. Berman, Addressing Why: Developing Principled Rationales 
for Family-Based Departures, 13 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 274, 278 (2001). 
150. See id. at 274 (“Because there has not been serious attention given to 
precisely why family circumstances should lead to a reduced sentence, 
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Sentencing theory traditionally focuses on the goals of criminal law—
deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, and retribution.151 Criminal 
law typically seeks to achieve these goals by focusing on the behavior of 
the defendant. Berman acknowledges that parental status can have 
some bearing on the wrongfulness of a defendant’s actions, the extent 
to which incarceration will inflict punishment, and the likelihood of 
rehabilitation.152 He argues, however, that it is difficult to articulate a 
principled basis for considering children’s interests for their own sake 
that is consistent with current sentencing jurisprudence.153 
Advocates for both prisoners and children have nonetheless long 
argued for greater consideration of parental status when incarcerating 
offenders.154 Some take a defendant-centered approach to the issue. A 
number of commentators point to studies showing that maintaining 
ties between offenders and their children reduces rates of recidivism 
among parents.155 Protecting parent-child ties, then, can be seen as a 
measure to reduce crime rates. Professor Myrna Raeder, a frequent 
advocate for the rights of incarcerated mothers and their children, 
suggests that considering parental status is also necessary as a matter 
of fairness, since parents who are incarcerated are punished more 
harshly than similarly situated offenders who are not parents, by 
virtue of the added pain inflicted by separation from their children.156 
She argues that sentencing courts deciding whether and where to 
incarcerate a parent should consider not only the offender’s parental 
 
the departure jurisprudence concerning family circumstances has been 
purposeless and sentencing outcomes have been inconsistent.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
151. See id. at 276. 
152. See id. at 277–78. 
153. See id. at 274 (“[I]t is difficult to provide a principled explanation for 
exactly why a criminal offender should merit a lesser punishment simply 
because he or she has a spouse or children or other relatives.”); see also 
id. at 278 (calling on the Sentencing Commission to “develop express 
principles concerning whether and when reduced sentences may be 
permitted under the guidelines based on the potential harm to a 
defendant’s family”). 
154. See, e.g., Genty, supra note 105, at 1683–84 (“The defendant’s role as a 
parent must be an explicit factor in sentencing.”). 
155. See Leslie Acoca & Myrna S. Raeder, Severing Family Ties: The Plight 
of Nonviolent Female Offenders and Their Children, 11 Stan. L. & 
Pol’y Rev. 133, 136 (1999) (“[T]here is considerable evidence that 
family relationships . . . affect the mother’s rehabilitation.”); John 
Hagan & Ronit Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment for 
Children, Communities, and Prisoners, 26 Crime & Just. 121, 142 
(1999) (“[S]trong family relationships during incarceration may lower 
recidivism rates . . . .”). 
156. See Raeder, supra note 105, at 745–46. 
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status but also the extent to which incarceration in a particular 
facility would make contact and visitation with a child more 
difficult.157 
Among those who take a child-centered approach to parental 
incarceration, the most common argument is that putting parents in 
prison has a criminogenic effect on the next generation, by increasing 
the likelihood that the children themselves will commit crimes in the 
future.158 A related argument is that incarcerating parents unfairly 
punishes children who have done nothing wrong. This argument is 
typically framed in criminogenic terms as well. As Judge Patricia 
Wald put it, incarcerating parents turns blameless children into the 
“next generation of . . . sociopathic criminals.”159 
The theoretical argument for considering parental status at 
sentencing has been enhanced in recent years by scholars who have 
added a constitutional perspective to a position that formerly was 
largely grounded in the pragmatic goal of reducing crime rates and 
the moral imperative of treating either offenders or their children 
fairly. Thus, Myrna Raeder contends that incarcerating mothers 
implicates the fundamental rights of parents to the custody and care 
of their children and argues that courts should take this into account 
more than they currently do when imposing sentences of 
incarceration.160 Chesa Boudin, who takes a child-centered approach 
to the issue, has put forth the argument that consideration of 
children’s interests when sentencing parents and developing prison 
policies is necessary in order to protect children’s First Amendment 
right of freedom of association and their due process liberty interest in 
maintaining family integrity.161  
 
157. See id. at 747 (“In deciding whether and where to incarcerate a mother 
of young children, . . . it is appropriate for judges to take into account 
the distance from home and visiting policies of the facility to which the 
female offender is likely to be incarcerated.”). 
158. See Hagan & Dinovitzer, supra note 155, at 146 (discussing studies 
indicating that children of incarcerated parents are significantly more 
likely to become incarcerated than their counterparts); Acoca & Raeder, 
supra note 155, at 136 (contending that children of incarcerated parents 
are “more likely to become victimizers of others”). 
159. Patricia M. Wald, “What About the Kids?”: Parenting Issues in 
Sentencing, 8 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 137, 138 (1995). 
160. See Raeder, supra note 105, at 723–26; see also id. at 744–45 (noting 
that incarceration may also reduce a woman’s chances of becoming 
pregnant, and arguing that “women’s advocates should boldly attempt 
to fashion [sentencing] arguments based on fundamental rights to 
privacy, birth, and family, citing constitutional and policy 
underpinnings for such a doctrine”). 
161. Boudin, supra note 105, at 105–12. 
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On the other side of the debate are those who argue that we 
should hesitate to take children’s interests into account when 
sentencing their parents. Professors Dan Markel, Jennifer Collins, and 
Ethan Leib are prominent voices on this side of the debate. They 
discuss parental incarceration in the context of their broader 
argument that family status generally should not be taken into 
account by the criminal law.162 While recognizing the unfairness to 
children of the harms inflicted by parental incarceration, they argue 
that it is preferable to attend to children’s interests in these cases by 
ameliorating prison policies163 and addressing larger social inequalities 
through distributive justice.164 They recommend limiting consideration 
of children’s interests at the sentencing of parents to a narrow set of 
circumstances—namely, to those cases where children would suffer a 
loss of “irreplaceable caregiving” upon a parent’s incarceration and 
where it would be feasible, moreover, to defer the parent’s 
incarceration.165 These recommendations would arguably limit 
consideration of children’s interests to an even greater extent than do 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.166 
Markel, Collins, and Leib make both a principled argument and a 
pragmatic one for limiting consideration of children’s interests at 
parental sentencing. On the level of principle, they assert that taking 
family ties into account in violates the principle of equal treatment 
under the law by treating similarly situated defendants differently on 
the basis of family status,167 and thereby undermines the legitimacy of 
the criminal justice system.168 Their pragmatic argument is that 
 
162. See Markel et al., supra note 3, at 49 (arguing that “ordinarily, a 
defendant’s family ties and responsibilities should not serve as a basis 
for a lighter sentence”). 
163. See id. at 53–56 (arguing for greater consideration of family ties in the 
penal system than at sentencing, for instance by considering “ease of 
access for those who may facilitate [the prisoner’s] reentry (whether 
family or friends) when making decisions regarding prison construction 
or prison assignment after conviction”). 
164. See id. at 50–51 (“Ordinarily, . . . we think that harms to innocent third 
parties should be ameliorated through the institutions of distributive 
justice, not criminal justice.”). 
165. See id. at 51. Markel, Collins, and Leib recommend extending such 
consideration not only to “those with a blood relationship or marriage,” 
but to any third parties with whom a defendant has an “established 
relationship of caregiving.” Id. 
166. See supra text accompanying notes 126–31. 
167. See Markel et al., supra note 3, at 31 (“[T]he principle of equality 
should be a lodestar guiding our collective actions in the criminal justice 
system.”). 
168. See id. at 30 (“[The] principle of equality under the law . . . is a 
prerequisite for a legitimate system of criminal justice.”); see also id. 
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affording special treatment to parents might increase crime rates by 
incentivizing parents to commit crimes.169 
As the debate currently stands, advocates of considering 
children’s interests at sentencing have had difficulty persuading those 
opposed to the practice to change their stance.170 The popular 
criminogenic argument for taking children’s interests into account—
that to do so would reduce crime rates by reducing the likelihood that 
the children themselves will commit crimes later in life—is vulnerable 
to the counterargument that letting parents off the hook could cut the 
other way. More importantly, the criminogenic argument does not 
address the objection that we need a principled basis for reducing 
parents’ sentences and that, in the absence of one, we should not 
sacrifice fairness for utility. It does not provide a satisfactory response 
to the argument of Markel et al. and others that to take parental 
status into account at sentencing violates the principle of equal justice 
under the law and thereby undermines the legitimacy of criminal law. 
A further problem with the current discussion concerning parental 
incarceration is that this discussion remains relatively marginalized 
within criminal law more generally. Much of the scholarly literature 
concerning criminal responsibility and the justification for criminal 
punishment does not merely fail to justify the harm that we inflict on 
offenders’ children; it fails to confront the issue at all. A major 
contribution of Markel, Collins, and Leib has been to provide a 
comprehensive account of family status throughout criminal law, thus 
bringing to the foreground an aspect of the field that a number of 
criminal law scholars and philosophers have largely overlooked.  
None of the arguments put forth in favor of considering parental 
status sufficiently makes the case that doing so is not just consistent 
with, but essential to, the underlying theoretical justifications of 
criminal law. Where parental status has no bearing on a defendant’s 
guilt, punishment, or rehabilitative potential, why should the criminal 
law attend to the interests of his or her child? The notion of 
preventing harm to helpless children is compelling, but those who 
 
(“Unjustified disparities in sentence disposition or duration contribute to 
the perception of the illegitimacy of the criminal justice system.”). 
169. See id. at 32 (“[I]f sentencing policies serve to create a nonincarcerable 
(or less carcerable) class of persons because these persons are 
‘irreplaceable caregivers,’ then those persons will seek out criminal 
endeavor or be, other things being equal, more sought after by others to 
serve in criminal enterprises.”). 
170. See, e.g., Myrna S. Raeder, Remember the Family: Seven Myths About 
Single Parenting Departures, 13 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 251, 251 (2001) (“It 
is disappointing to realize that nearly ten years have passed since I first 
began writing about the sentencing guidelines’ shortsighted policy of 
discouraging family ties as a basis for a departure, during which time 
there has been no significant change in that policy.”). 
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urge us to do so have yet to formulate a principled argument for why 
criminal law should address children’s interests when sentencing 
parents and how doing so can be consistent with criminal law’s 
legitimacy. 
This Article argues that a principled argument for taking 
children’s interests into account—one consistent with the legitimacy 
of criminal law—is available if we look beyond the confines of 
criminal law to consider family law’s insights on the connection 
between childhood and the adult self. These insights, in turn, bring 
out the currently overlooked relationship between theories of criminal 
responsibility, on the one hand, and our treatment of offenders’ 
children, on the other.171 Family law thus helps to demonstrate that 
the question of parental incarceration has greater bearing on the 
underlying justifications of criminal law than has previously been 
recognized.  
B. Contract Law 
At the opposite end of the coerciveness spectrum from criminal 
law—which can place a parent in prison—is contract law, which 
enforces agreements freely entered into between private parties. 
Regardless of how one stands on taking children’s interests into 
account in criminal cases involving parents, it is irrefutable that the 
decision to incarcerate a child’s parent can have profound and 
harmful consequences for the child. Accordingly, despite resistance to 
taking children’s interests into account, criminal law, as we have seen, 
does provide for doing so in at least some instances. Within the 
context of criminal law, then, courts and commentators are 
accustomed to recognizing and articulating the connection between 
the legal treatment of parents and the well-being of their children. 
The effect on children of contract litigation involving their 
parents is less obvious, and thus less often remarked upon. We 
recognize that children are affected by contracts that involve them 
directly, such as a contract reallocating parental rights. And contract 
law also acknowledges that children are affected by contracts to which 
they are parties. But there is virtually no discussion, by either courts 
or commentators, of how children are affected by ordinary commercial 
or consumer contracts involving private parties who happen to be 
parents. 
Yet when we approach ordinary parental contracts from family law’s 
perspective on the myriad factors that can alter a child’s development, 
we see that the enforcement of any private contract, insofar as it affects a 
child’s parent, can affect the child as well, often profoundly. This Section 
will discuss how children are potentially affected by contracts involving 
 
171. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
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their parents, and the extent to which the law takes children’s interests 
into account when enforcing such contracts. 
1. How Contract Litigation Can Affect Nonparty Children 
Any type of contract litigation can affect the children of parties to 
the litigation. Contract law governs a wide range of transactions, such 
as consumer credit agreements, large-scale commercial transactions, 
and employment agreements, that can have significant financial as 
well as other consequences for parties who happen to be parents. 
Where parents are affected by the outcome of a contract dispute, 
children may be as well.  
Consider, for instance, a distributorship agreement giving a 
parent exclusive rights to market a certain brand of shoes in a 
geographical area. On signing the contract, the parent invests 
extensive resources building and maintaining a store that sells only 
that brand of shoes. Five years pass, and the shoe manufacturer 
decides to provide the shoes to a major department store chain, which 
will effectively put the parent’s shoe store out of business. The 
contract is silent about when the exclusive distributorship ends, and 
the court must determine whether the manufacturer is liable for the 
damages caused by the termination. Consider the scenario in which, 
should the court decide that the manufacturer has a right to 
terminate the agreement without paying damages, the parent will 
suffer catastrophic financial losses. Imagine that this will mean that 
her family, including two young children, will lose their home, and 
that the children will be taken out of their schools, where they have 
been thriving.  
As we have seen in the context of family law’s best-interests 
analysis, any of these disruptions to a child’s life—financial hardship, 
change of schools, and geographical relocation—can harm the child’s 
development.172 Family law courts try to avoid such disruptions on 
the theory that they may diminish children’s future well-being and 
their likelihood of becoming autonomous, productive, and happy 
adults.173 Should the court in our hypothetical take the potential 
effects on children into account when enforcing the contract governing 
the exclusive distributorship agreement? Should harm to children 
affect the manufacturer’s right to terminate the agreement or the 
damages awarded to the parent if the contract has indeed been 
breached? No court or scholar to date has addressed such a 
possibility. 
The distributorship agreement affects children only remotely; 
other parental contracts more directly influence children’s lives. At 
one end of the influence spectrum are contracts that reallocate 
 
172. See supra Part I.B. 
173. See supra Part I.B. 
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parental rights, such as surrogacy contracts and prenuptial custody 
agreements. Children are clearly directly affected by contracts of 
which they are the subject matter. Contracts in the middle of the 
spectrum consist of those that relate to the child in some way, such as 
agreements concerning children’s education and health insurance. 
Toward the indirect end of the influence spectrum are contracts that 
do not immediately concern the children, but affect them by affecting 
their parents, such as contracts relating to employment, home 
ownership, or consumer credit. At the far end of the spectrum are 
agreements between commercial actors, such as the hypothetical 
distributorship agreement discussed above, that are even further 
removed from the parties’ children, but may have consequences for 
them nonetheless. To what extent should courts take children’s 
interests into account in these situations? When, if ever, should a 
court treat a contract differently simply because one of the parties 
happens to be a parent? 
2. Current Judicial Approaches 
a. The General Irrelevance of Parties’ Status as Parents 
Under classical contract theory, the status of a contracting party as 
the parent of a minor child is irrelevant. The premise of classical contract 
theory—and of the revived forms of that theory, such as the notion of 
contract as promise—is that the role of contract law is to enforce 
whatever bargains parties make amongst themselves, instead of policing 
and second guessing those bargains on the basis of each party’s status.174 
A contract is an arm’s-length bargain between two autonomous 
individuals who freely consent to be bound to one another.175 
Where a party cannot consent to an agreement—for instance, if, 
at the time of contract formation, a party lacks capacity for full 
rational choice because of infancy or other reasons, or lacks volition 
because of duress—contract law will recognize this by finding that 
there is no enforceable agreement.176 Thus, when a child agrees to  
174. Henry Maine famously claimed that freedom of contract had brought 
about a shift “from Status to Contract.” Henry Sumner Maine, 
Ancient Law 174 (10th ed. 1920) (1861). 
175. See P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract 
404–08 (1979) (providing a historical account of the rise of classical 
contract theory, and of the notion that courts should enforce whatever 
agreements the parties arrange amongst themselves instead of policing 
the fairness of bargains). For recent revivals of the classical liberal 
emphasis on autonomy and individual choice as the justification for 
contract enforcement, see Charles Fried, Contract as Promise 16 
(1981), and Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 
Colum. L. Rev. 269 (1986).  
176. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 4.2 (4th ed. 2004) 
(incapacity generally); id. § 4.4 (incapacity because of infancy); id. 
§ 4.19 (duress). 
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form a contract, special rules apply to limit the enforceability of the 
agreement.177 But as long as two parties capable of giving legal 
consent have agreed to be bound by what would otherwise be an 
enforceable contract, each party’s status is irrelevant, and a court will 
not take either party’s familial obligations or other burdens into 
account when enforcing the contract.  
Contemporary theories of contract law have complicated and 
contested the classical approach. Relational contract theory, for 
instance, recognizes that parties to a long-term contract are not at 
arm’s length, but instead are bound to one another by their contractual 
relationship, and as such owe one another duties beyond those owed by 
strangers engaged in discrete transactions.178 In another strand of 
contemporary contract theory, some ground contract law in concerns 
about distributive justice179 or fairness,180 in a way that takes both 
status and contractual context into account. Thus, some argue that 
special rules should apply to contracts between certain types of parties, 
such as landlords and tenants, in a way that recognizes the unequal 
power between these groups, and shifts wealth from one to another.181 
Finally, scholars have noted, and much debated, the special treatment 
afforded familial contracts, such as interspousal contracts for household 
labor,182 premarital agreements,183 and contracts reallocating parental 
 
177. See id. § 4.4 (contracts by infants enforceable only if for necessaries); 
see also Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a 
Comprehensive and Consistent Vision of Children and Their Status 
Under Law, 10 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol’y 275, 287–94 (2006) 
(contesting contract law’s construction of children’s incapacity).  
178. For the foundational work on relational contract theory, see Ian R. 
Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
340 (1983), and Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges 
and Queries, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 877 (2000).  
179. See Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 
Yale L.J. 472 (1980); Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare 
State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and 
Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. Legal Stud. 
283 (1995). 
180. See James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 1587 
(1981). 
181. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 
Yale L.J. 763, 772 (1983) (justifying the nondisclaimable warranty of 
habitability as “an instrument of redistribution that seeks to shift 
control over housing from one group (landlords) to another (tenants)”). 
182. See Hasday, supra note 2, at 499–507 (arguing that the law refuses to 
enforce interspousal contracts for domestic services in order to signal the 
special and intimate nature of spousal relationships); Reva B. Siegel, 
The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives’ Rights 
to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 Geo. L.J. 2127, 2130 (1994) (tracing the 
early history of wives’ unsuccessful attempts to enforce interspousal 
contracts for domestic services and characterizing this trend as 
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rights and obligations.184 It continues to be a premise of contract law, 
however, that each party’s status outside the scope of the contractual 
relationship—a party’s status as a woman or a mother, for instance, in 
a contract for the sale of goods—is irrelevant to contract enforcement.  
In short, whether a party to a contract has a child generally has 
no bearing on how or whether the contract is enforced. The familial 
status of the parties is relevant, if at all, only insofar as it has bearing 
on the parties’ relationship to each other, and thus to the power 
dynamic between them (for instance, under the doctrine of undue 
influence, where the parties are spouses, this may impose heightened 
duties of fairness on their contractual dealings)185 or to the contract 
itself (for instance, spouses are not always permitted to contractually 
reconfigure their marital obligations).186 With a few rare exceptions, 
which this Article will now discuss, a contracting party’s parental 
obligations are not seen as worthy of mention, let alone consideration, 
by either scholars or courts.  
b. Exceptions 
Contracts Reallocating Parental Rights. As a rule, courts will not 
take children’s interests into account when adjudicating contracts 
made by their parents. Courts adjudicating contract disputes will 
rarely see fit even to acknowledge that a party to the contract is the 
caretaker of a minor child. The primary exception to this rule occurs 
 
transforming into the modern idiom of contract doctrine the status-
based notion that the husband owns his wife’s labor). 
183. While a minority of states treat premarital agreements as ordinary 
contracts, see, e.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990), many 
states police such agreements for both procedural and substantive 
fairness, see, e.g., Blige v. Blige, 656 S.E.2d 822 (Ga. 2008). On the 
other hand, slightly more than half of the states have adopted the 
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA), under which, apart from 
certain limited exceptions, premarital agreements are unenforceable only 
if either they were not entered into voluntarily or they are both 
procedurally unfair for lack of financial disclosure and substantively 
unfair because they contain unconscionable terms. See Unif. 
Premarital Agreement Act § 6 (2001). As many have noted, the 
UPAA “appears to require a greater showing before invalidating an 
agreement than would conventional contract law.” Brian Bix, 
Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital 
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 145, 156 (1998) (summarizing current approaches to and scholarly 
debate over enforcement of premarital agreements). 
184. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.b. 
185. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 177 (1981) (contract 
unenforceable where parties with special relationships, such as spouses, 
take advantage of those relationships to exercise unfair persuasion). 
186. See supra note 183. 
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when children are directly involved in the contract in question. The 
paradigmatic instance of this is when a contract reallocates parental 
rights. Here, where children are the subject matter of contractual 
exchange, courts do acknowledge that children’s interests are at stake 
and take those interests into account in determining whether and how 
the contract should be enforced. 
Thus, courts routinely consider children’s interests in determining 
whether to enforce custody agreements between parents.187 Courts will 
typically refuse to enforce a custody agreement that is part of a 
premarital contract, on the basis that such an agreement is likely to 
have little relevance to a child’s interests.188 The rule in most states is 
that even a custody agreement reached at the time of separation or 
divorce is enforceable only to the extent that it is consistent with the 
child’s best interests.189 Many of these states will consider the 
agreement as a factor in assessing the child’s interests,190 and some 
will presume that those interests correspond with the agreement,191 
 
187. See Linda Jellum, Parents Know Best: Revising Our Approach to 
Parental Custody Agreements, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 615 (2004) (arguing for 
greater deference to parental custody agreements, and noting that the 
majority of states give no deference to such agreements). 
188. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Best, 901 N.E.2d 967, 970 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2009) (“The law severely limits on public policy grounds the 
enforceability of contracts affecting the custody and support of minor 
children. Illinois law per se rejects premarital agreements that impair 
child-support rights or specify custody.”). 
189. See, e.g., Eickbush v. Eickbush, 171 P.3d 509, 511–12 (Wyo. 2007) 
(“[C]ourts have a duty to disregard, if necessary, agreements entered 
into by parents and to make provision for the proper support and care 
of minor children according to their best interests. This obligation arises 
because although the settlement agreement significantly impacts the 
children, they are not parties to the contract nor are they typically 
represented in the negotiation thereof.” (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Zahl v. Zahl, 736 N.W.2d 365, 368 (Neb. 
2007) (holding that parental agreements do not control child custody 
because the court must look to the children’s best interests); Brockman 
v. Brockman (In re Marriage of Brockman), 240 Cal. Rptr. 96, 98–100 
(Ct. App. 1987) (same). 
190. See, e.g., Eschbach v. Eschbach, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1263 (N.Y. 1982) 
(“[N]o agreement of the parties can bind the court to a disposition other 
than that which a weighing of all the factors involved shows to be in the 
child’s best interests. Thus, an agreement between the parties is but one 
factor to be weighed by the court in deciding whether a change of 
custody is warranted.”) (citations and internal quotation mark 
omitted)).  
191. See, e.g., Keen v. Keen, 629 N.E.2d 938, 941–42 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) 
(holding that parents’ agreement as to custody must be given great 
weight but cannot be enforced where court has clear basis for finding it 
at odds with children’s best interests); Serr v. Serr, 746 N.W.2d 416, 419 
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but under both approaches, the child’s best interests prevail. One 
state, West Virginia, will enforce parenting arrangements agreed to by 
separating or divorcing parents unless it is shown that doing so is 
harmful to a child.192 No state, then, will enforce a custody agreement 
without taking the child’s interests into account to some extent. In 
the arena of child custody, children’s interests predominate over the 
usual rules of contract law. 
Another type of agreement related to children is a contract by 
which the parties agree to terminate, transfer, or take on parental 
rights. This includes adoption agreements, which are regulated by 
state statute and must be approved by judicial decree,193 and 
surrogacy agreements, which are increasingly regulated by statute as 
well.194 When a contract reallocating parental status has come before 
 
(N.D. 2008) (holding that parents’ stipulation as to custody to be given 
great deference but is not determinative). 
192. See W. Va. Code Ann. § 48-9-201 (LexisNexis 2009) (requiring courts 
to enforce parenting plans entered into voluntarily and knowingly unless 
harmful to the child); cf. id. § 48-9-206 (providing that, where parents 
cannot agree on such a plan, courts allocating custody should take into 
account “any prior agreement of the parents” where “appropriate . . . 
under the circumstances as a whole including the reasonable 
expectations of the parents in the interest of the child”).  
193. See Grossberg, supra note 69, at 268–80 (tracing the history of state 
regulation of adoption, beginning with Massachusetts in 1851); Unif. 
Adoption Act § 3-703 (1994) (requiring determination that adoption is 
in child’s best interests in order for court to approve adoption petition, 
even where biological parents have consented to the adoption); see also 
Annette Ruth Appell, The Move Toward Legally Sanctioned 
Cooperative Adoption: Can it Survive the Uniform Adoption Act?, 30 
Fam. L.Q. 483 (1996) (describing need for greater enforcement of 
agreements providing for post-adoption contact, and summarizing five 
state statutes permitting such agreements with consent of the court). 
But see Amanda C. Pustilnik, Note, Private Ordering, Legal Ordering, 
and the Getting of Children: A Counterhistory of Adoption Law, 20 
Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 263, 264 (2002) (setting forth a “counterhistory 
[that] presents adoption practice and law as nonstatutory, with deep 
private-ordering roots in contract law”). 
194. A number of state statutes prohibit enforcement of surrogacy 
agreements. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-218(A) (2011); 
Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.855 (2012); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 122 
(McKinney 2010). Other states have enacted legislation imposing lesser 
restrictions on surrogacy contracts, such as providing that they are 
unenforceable when compensation is involved. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. 
Stat. § 25-21,200 (2008); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 26.26.230, 26.26.240 
(2010). Still other states have statutorily provided for enforcement of 
surrogacy agreements in certain limited circumstances; in Virginia, for 
instance, such agreements are enforceable if the intending parents and 
the surrogate meet a number of requirements (including that the 
intended mother is infertile or has medical reasons for not being able to 
bear a child) and obtain judicial pre-conception approval of the 
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courts in the absence of a clear statutory rule on the subject, the 
response has often been to refuse to enforce the contract on public 
policy grounds.195 Thus, in the well-known Baby M case, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court refused to enforce a surrogacy contract by 
which a biological mother agreed to terminate her parental rights and 
allow her child to be raised by the biological father and his wife.196 
While the court had several public-policy objections to the surrogacy 
contract, it found that “worst of all” was “the contract’s total 
disregard of the best interests of the child.”197 Such an agreement, the 
court found, was “based on . . . principles that are directly contrary 
to the objectives of our laws,” because it allocated parental rights in a 
manner that “totally ignore[d] the child.”198 Other courts refusing to 
enforce such agreements have similarly asserted that custody decisions 
must be based, not on parental contracts, but on judicial assessment 
of the child’s best interests.199 
When it comes to considerations of children’s interests in 
contracts involving their parents, then, the law takes an all-or-nothing 
approach. In the majority of cases, the fact that a parent has children 
who may be affected by enforcement of the parent’s contract is 
 
agreement. See Va. Code Ann. § 20-160 (Supp. 2012). But see id. § 20-
161 (directing court to vacate the order approving the agreement where 
a genetically related surrogate decides to terminate the agreement 
within 180 days of assisted conception). For a summary of current state 
approaches to surrogacy, see Darra L. Hofman, “Momma’s Baby, 
Daddy’s Maybe”: A State-by-State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their 
Disparate Gender Impact, 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 449 (2009).  
195. See, e.g., R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796–97 (Mass. 1998) (refusing 
to enforce traditional surrogacy contract); T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 
1244, 1251 (Mass. 2004) (refusing to enforce agreement to assume 
parental rights and obligations, on the basis that “‘[p]arenthood by 
contract’ is not the law in Massachusetts”). But cf. Johnson v. Calvert, 
851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (finding that gestational 
surrogacy agreement was not inconsistent with public policy and could 
therefore be considered as evidence of intent to parent in order to 
resolve dispute between birth mother and genetic mother, both of whom 
fit the statutory definition of “natural mother”). For the early history of 
courts’ refusal to enforce adoption contracts before a statutory 
mechanism was in place to facilitate adoptions, see Abramowicz, supra 
note 73.  
196. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1237 (N.J. 1988) (finding that surrogacy 
agreement conflicted both with public policy considerations and with 
statutory provisions prohibiting compensation for adoption and making 
consent to adoption revocable in private placement adoptions). 
197. Id. at 1248. 
198. Id. at 1250. 
199. See R.R., 689 N.E.2d at 797 (“The mother and father may not . . . 
make a binding best-interests-of-the-child determination by private 
agreement.”). 
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treated as altogether irrelevant. Where a contract reallocates parental 
rights, however, an entirely different set of rules applies. Contract law 
drops away entirely, and family law takes over.200 Contracts 
reallocating parental rights are not enforced as contractual 
obligations; instead, they become, at most, one factor a court can 
consider in assessing the paramount concern of child custody law—the 
best interests of the child. 
Children and Negative Externalities. Contract theory does provide 
a potential basis for taking children’s interests into account in cases 
that affect them indirectly: the concept of negative externalities. A 
negative externality is the harm a contract inflicts on third persons 
who are not parties to the contract.201 To take an extreme case, a 
contract for murder would impose a negative externality on the 
targeted victim, as well as on society at large, which is harmed by the 
violation of its criminal laws. The law protects against such negative 
externalities by holding such contracts illegal and unenforceable.202 
Another example is a noncompetition agreement that harms the 
public by distorting market forces and restraining trade. Here, too, 
the law will protect against these unwanted negative externalities by 
limiting the enforcement of such contracts as against public policy.203  
200. Scholars continue to debate the differential treatment of contracts 
reallocating parental rights, particularly in the wake of the new 
permutations of parenthood permitted by assisted reproductive 
technology. See, e.g., Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology 
and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 
1990 Wis. L. Rev. 297, 396–98 (arguing for enforcing such agreements 
in the context of assisted reproductive technology, with protective 
mechanisms to ensure disclosure and informed consent); Marsha 
Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to 
the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 835, 865 
(2000) (arguing against the enforcement of such agreements, on the 
basis that “our legal tradition precludes per se enforcement of all 
contracts concerning children” and that there is no evidence that the 
situation of assisted reproductive technology is sufficiently different to 
justify inconsistent treatment). 
201. As F.H. Buckley explains, “What I do affects others, for good or for ill, 
and this may supply a reason to restrict bargaining freedom. The 
economist’s assumption that a person will not agree to a contract which 
leaves him worse off might have little traction when the costs are born 
by an unwilling third party.” F.H. Buckley, Perfectionism, 13 Sup. Ct. 
Econ. Rev. 133, 139 (2005). 
202. See, e.g., McMahon v. Anderson, 728 A.2d 656, 658 (D.C. 1999) 
(“[W]hen parties have entered into an illegal contract, such contract is 
unenforceable.”); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178 cmt. b 
(1981) (“[W]hen an agreement involves a serious crime . . . 
unenforceability is plain.”).  
203. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 186(1) (1981) (“A 
promise is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if it is unreasonably 
in restraint of trade.”). 
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According to those who explain contract law from an economic or 
efficiency perspective, the goal of limiting negative externalities is 
behind several features of contract law,204 from the refusal to enforce 
certain contracts on the basis of illegality or public policy to the 
limitation of contractual freedom through mandatory default rules.205 
From an economic perspective, negative externalities render a 
contract inefficient,206 and thus militate against enforcement,207 when 
they impose costs on third parties that significantly outweigh the 
benefits to both contracting parties.208 Attention to negative 
externalities is also mandated by the liberal, autonomy-based 
approach to contract law, which holds that negative externalities form 
a necessary limit to contractual freedom, because the right of 
individual liberty, including freedom of contract, does not entail a 
right to inflict harm on others.209  
 
204. See Margaret Friedlander Brinig, A Maternalistic Approach to 
Surrogacy: Comment on Richard Epstein’s Surrogacy: The Case for Full 
Contractual Enforcement, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2377, 2390 (1995) 
(“According to economic analysis, contracts . . . become less than fully 
enforceable where there are substantial negative third-party effects.”). 
205. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: 
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 88–89 (1989) 
(describing prevention of harm to third parties as one of the two 
primary normative justifications for imposing immutable rules that limit 
freedom of contract). 
206. Economists speak of two types of efficiency, Pareto efficiency and 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. A transaction is Pareto efficient when it makes 
at least one party better off, and makes no one worse off. A transaction 
is Kaldor-Hicks efficient where it maximizes welfare in the aggregate, in 
that, in a world with no transaction costs, the parties that benefit from 
the transaction could pay off those that suffer from it. See Richard A. 
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 12–13 (3d ed. 1986). 
207. See Michael J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract 
58–61 (1993) (explaining how refusals to enforce contracts on the basis 
of negative externalities can be seen as consistent with the economic, 
efficiency-based approach to legal analysis). 
208. As many have noted, the question of when negative externalities are 
sufficient to render a contract unenforceable raises a difficult problem of 
line drawing. See Richard A. Epstein, Externalities Everywhere?: Morals 
and the Police Power, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 61, 63 (1997) 
(“Simply to point out that . . . externalities exist, however, is not to 
demonstrate that they always exceed the private gains to the parties—
or even that the costs of preventing the external harms is smaller than 
the harms themselves.”); Trebilcock, supra note 207, at 58 (“Almost 
every transaction one can conceive of is likely to impose costs on third 
parties.”). 
209. See Trebilcock, supra note 207, at 61–64 (discussing the connection 
between concern with externalities and the liberal theory of harm 
promulgated by John Stuart Mill). 
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Children are often considered relevant victims of externalities in 
the context of familial contracts. Indeed, the concept of negative 
externalities in the form of harm to children is held up as justifying 
the limited enforceability of such contracts. For instance, a number of 
scholars who oppose the enforcement of surrogacy contracts have 
grounded their position in the notion that such contracts inflict 
negative externalities on children,210 such as conveying that they are 
commodities211 or allocating them to new parents without assessing 
their interests.212 Courts refusing to enforce surrogacy contracts, while 
not using the term “negative externalities,” have used a similar 
logic.213 Children are also seen as victims of negative externalities in 
connection with other contracts allocating parental rights, such as 
custody agreements.214 Some have argued that negative externalities 
affecting children should likewise be considered in the context of the 
enforcement of marital property agreements, even where these do not 
directly touch upon the custody or care of the children themselves.215 
 
210. See Brinig, supra note 204, at 2381, 2384–85, 2391–92 (discussing the 
third-party effects of surrogacy contracts on children, including the 
surrogate’s other children, and concluding that such contracts should 
not be enforced); see also Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for 
Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2305, 2320–23 (1995) 
(acknowledging that children are relevant externalities in assessing the 
enforceability of surrogate contracts, but concluding that the risk of 
harm to children is not high enough to warrant a limit on the 
enforcement of such contracts). 
211. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 
1849, 1928–29 (1987). 
212. See Garrison, supra note 200, at 892–98 (arguing that there is no reason 
to except surrogacy from the usual rule that contracts allocating 
parental rights are void when at odds with a child’s best interests); Jana 
B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1443, 
1555–56 (proposing that the trend toward privatization in family law, 
including surrogacy contracts, be limited when children’s interests are at 
stake); see also Judith Areen, Baby M Reconsidered, 76 Geo. L.J. 
1741, 1747 (1988) (opposing enforcement of surrogacy contracts on the 
basis, inter alia, that they put children at risk by increasing the 
likelihood that they will be abandoned at birth).  
213. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1246 (N.J. 1988) (finding surrogacy 
contract unenforceable on the basis, inter alia, that it allocated custody 
without determining the best interests of the child). 
214. See Singer, supra note 212, at 1553 (raising possibility of “two-tiered” 
system limiting private agreements regarding family relations when 
children are involved). 
215. See Carolyn J. Frantz, Should the Rules of Marital Property Be 
Normative?, 2004 U. Chi. Legal F. 265, 282 (noting that harms to 
children are currently considered relevant externalities in the rules 
governing marital property division); see also Elizabeth S. Scott, 
Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 Va. L. Rev. 
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Any contract that adversely affects children could be 
characterized as inflicting a negative externality. This includes 
contracts that do not concern either the children themselves or the 
structure of their family, such as a commercial or consumer contract 
to which a parent is a party. If the terms of the commercial or 
consumer contract are adverse to the parent, such that enforcement 
will cause significant economic distress, then they are likely to be 
adverse to the child as well, insofar as children’s fortunes typically 
follow those of their parents. As with any negative externality, there 
may be good reasons not to take harm to children into account. But 
it seems undeniable that harms to children are potential negative 
externalities to many types of contracts involving their parents. 
Neither courts nor theorists, however, have considered children 
relevant victims of negative externalities in non-familial contracts 
involving their parents. While harms to children are often considered 
in connection with contracts that reconfigure the family, children are 
typically absent from discussions of parental contracts that have no 
direct connection to family matters, such as ordinary commercial or 
consumer contracts. Despite the potential harms that such contracts 
may inflict on the children of the parties who form them, there is 
currently little or no analysis of such harms either in the case law or 
in the scholarly literature on negative externalities in contract law.  
Unconscionability.  While not typically framed as such, the 
doctrine of unconscionability provides another possible mechanism for 
courts to take children’s interests into account in enforcing contracts 
that affect them indirectly. Unconscionability has both a substantive 
and a procedural aspect. Courts may refuse to enforce a contract if 
either its terms (substantive unconscionability) or the bargaining 
process (procedural unconscionability) are so unfair as to suggest that 
no meaningful choice was exercised in the formation of the contract.216 
A court refusing to enforce a contract on the basis of 
unconscionability often points to a combination of substantive and 
procedural unconscionability, such as an inequality of bargaining 
power that produces unreasonably oppressive contractual terms.217 
 
9, 87–91 (1990) (advocating that divorce be made more difficult to 
obtain when children are involved). 
216. See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s 
New Clause, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485, 488 (1967) (formulating the 
distinction between procedural and substantive unconscionability). 
217. See Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of 
Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 Fla. St. 
U. L. Rev. 1067, 1074–76, 1098 (2006) (demonstrating through 
empirical study that while courts often articulate a need for both a 
substantive and a procedural element to render a contract unenforceable 
on the basis of unconscionability, substantive unconscionability alone 
can also, in practice, suffice). 
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Unconscionability is measured at the time the contract is formed, and 
hence typically requires overreaching by the dominant party.218 
There is no suggestion in the contracts literature that 
unconscionability applies, in particular, to contracts involving parties 
with minor children. But unconscionability doctrine gives courts 
leeway to take a party’s situation—including parental obligations—
into account in assessing the unfairness of the bargaining process and 
of contractual terms. Thus, in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture 
Co., the most well-known case on unconscionability doctrine, the 
court seemed to take a consumer’s status as a mother into account in 
assessing the fairness of her contract with a retail furniture store.219 
The contract between Mrs. Williams and the Walker-Thomas 
Furniture Company provided for an installment payment plan 
whereby the store could repossess everything Mrs. Williams purchased 
over several years if she defaulted on a payment for any one item. In 
condemning the store for contract terms that it saw as “unreasonably 
favorable”220 to the seller, the court noted, in particular, that the store 
sold Mrs. Williams a $514 stereo set on this plan, even though it knew 
that she still owed a balance on previously purchased furniture, and 
that she lived on a welfare check of $218 per month and “had to feed, 
clothe and support both herself and seven children on this amount.”221 
The Williams court did not expressly articulate a doctrine under 
which courts will assess unconscionability by looking to the effects on 
a party’s minor children of enforcing the terms of a contract. But the 
court did treat Mrs. Williams’s status as a mother of seven children—
and the store’s awareness of this status—as relevant to its assessment 
of both the behavior of the store and the fairness of the contract 
terms. The Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, the court appeared 
to suggest, should have refrained from allowing someone so financially 
constrained, and with seven dependents, to enter into such an 
unfavorable arrangement, particularly for a nonnecessity such as a 
stereo.222 In assessing the unfairness of the repossession arrangement, 
 
218. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2012) (court may refuse to enforce contract if 
unconscionable at time it was made).  
219. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 
1965). 
220. Id. at 449. 
221. Id. at 448 (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 
914, 916 (D.C. 1964)). 
222. See id. (“The reverse side of the stereo contract listed the name of 
appellant’s social worker and her $218 monthly stipend from the 
government. Nevertheless, with full knowledge that appellant had to 
feed, clothe and support both herself and seven children on this amount, 
appellee sold her a $514 stereo set.” (quoting Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 916 (D.C. 1964))); see also id. at 
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moreover, the court seemed to consider the harm that enforcement 
would inflict on the seven children of this single mother. The 
implication is that courts can wield the unconscionability doctrine to 
encourage contracting parties to take special care not to exploit 
economically vulnerable parties with dependent children. 
While Williams seemingly enables courts to take parental status 
into account in assessing unconscionability, no commentator frames 
the case as extending unconscionability to contract disputes where 
children’s interests are at stake. The fact that the Williams plaintiff 
had seven children is frequently mentioned in accounts of the case.223 
But the bearing of the case on children as a general matter is rarely 
raised in discussions of Williams and its progeny.224 Despite the 
mention of children in Williams, neither courts nor commentators 
explicitly frame unconscionability doctrine as potentially taking 
children’s interests into account in contracts involving their parents. 
3. Arguments About Considering Children’s Interests 
Throughout most of contract law, children are invisible. They are 
taken into account in exceptional situations involving custody 
agreements, for instance, or contracts by children themselves. In such 
cases, the usual rules of contract law do not apply, and family-law 
principles or paternalism take over instead. But when it comes to 
ordinary contract disputes, courts and contract theorists rarely 
contemplate the possibility that children’s interests could be taken 
into account in enforcing contracts involving their parents. 
To the extent that commentators have touched upon the effect on 
children of the law that regulates their parents’ nonfamilial contracts, 
they have done so obliquely. An example is the attention to children 
in recent discussions of mortgage and foreclosure law, which, while it 
rests upon contractual arrangements, is more heavily regulated than 
contract law generally, and thus would seem more amenable to taking 
children’s interests into account.225 The current financial crisis has 
 
450 (Danaher, J., dissenting) (“What is a luxury to some may seem an 
outright necessity to others.”). 
223. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 216, at 555 (noting that the Walker-Thomas 
Company knew that Mrs. Williams had seven children). 
224. A typically brief and undeveloped mention of children in connection 
with the Williams case occurs in Arthur Leff’s seminal article on 
unconscionability doctrine. Leff criticizes the application of the doctrine 
in Williams as “sneakily” working to achieve goals that no legislature 
would openly admit to, such as the goal of “foster[ing] in the deserving 
poor” the “traditional middle-class virtues of thrift and child care.” Id. 
at 558. 
225. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667 (2006) 
(mandating certain disclosures from lenders to home buyers); see 
generally Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: 
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made clear that children are affected, often deeply so, when a bank 
forecloses on the family home or evicts a family because it has 
foreclosed on the landlord. In the recent furor over the foreclosure 
crisis, both politicians and the media have focused on harm to families 
from foreclosure on their homes, and have spoken in particular about 
harm to children.226  
Despite the attention to the harms inflicted on children by the 
financial crisis, there is little discussion by lawmakers or legal scholars 
of the possibility that foreclosure law treat parties differently on the 
basis that they are the parents of minor children. When lawmakers 
have confronted the foreclosure crisis, despite the rhetoric of saving 
“families,” they have for the most part protected homeowners and 
renters generally, as opposed to singling out those with minor children 
or other dependents.227 Only a few scattered municipalities have 
enacted ordinances requiring special treatment of foreclosure evictions 
where children are involved; one example is San Francisco, which 
recently enacted legislation prohibiting owner move-in evictions 
during the school year where households include children under the 
age of eighteen.228 
The primary area in which parties with children may be treated 
differently in the context of foreclosure evictions is in the practical 
application of laws that are facially neutral with respect to children. 
Thus, a family with children may be given protective treatment by a 
court setting an eviction date, or overseeing the renegotiation of a 
mortgage contract. And in some instances, the sheriff charged with 
executing an eviction order may hesitate where young children are 
involved. Thus, for instance, in late 2008, Thomas J. Dart, the sheriff 
of Cook County, Illinois, suspended all foreclosure evictions, 
 
The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 Duke L.J. 1399 (2004) 
(discussing history of state and federal regulation of foreclosures). 
226. See, e.g., Stephanie Armour, Foreclosures’ Financial Strains Take Toll on 
Kids, USA Today, July 9, 2008, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/ 
economy/housing/2008-07-08-children-foreclosure-homeless_N.htm. 
227. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Mayor, City of Providence, R.I., 
New Hope for Homeowners & Tenants Facing Foreclosure (Aug. 7, 
2009), available at http://cityof.providenceri.com/NewsReleaseArchive/ 
article.php?id=545 (quoting mayor as explaining that city foreclosure 
ordinance, which protects tenants and homeowners regardless of family 
status, was intended to “protect families from the impact of a 
nationwide foreclosure crisis that has devastated too many families in 
our neighborhoods”). 
228. See S.F. Admin. Code § 37.9(j)(1) (2011) (“It shall be a defense to an 
eviction . . . if any tenant in the rental unit has a custodial or family 
relationship with a child under the age of 18 who is residing in the unit, 
the tenant with the custodial or family relationship has resided in the 
unit for 12 months or more, and the effective date of the notice of 
termination of tenancy falls during the school year.”). 
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describing the experience of “seeing little children put out on the 
street with their possessions” as “gut-wrenching.”229 But such 
exceptions are rare and are at odds with the applicable law.  
Federal lawmakers have not ignored the plight of children 
altogether. But their efforts to help children have been directed either 
at all victims of foreclosure or at situations not directly connected to 
contracts and foreclosure law, such as education funding. Thus, for 
instance, initial legislation on the current foreclosure and housing 
crisis—the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008230—included 
a provision directing federal funds to educational institutions able to 
provide assistance to children who became homeless as a result of 
foreclosure of the family home or eviction from foreclosed rental 
properties.231 Insofar as it directly regulates foreclosure, however, this 
same legislation does not treat families with children differently from 
other homeowners and renters. 
A similar pattern occurs in the context of bankruptcy law. 
Bankruptcy law does not, for the most part, take into account 
whether parties have dependent children when determining whether 
to permit a discharge in bankruptcy.232 Nevertheless, one of the 
rationales for extending the right to a discharge in bankruptcy, and 
for contract law’s refusal to enforce a waiver of that right,233 is that 
bankruptcy provides protection to a debtor’s dependents, including 
children. Contracts scholar Charles Fried has noted that the right to 
 
229. John Leland, Sheriff in Chicago Ends Evictions in Foreclosures, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 8, 2008, at A14. 
230. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 
Stat. 2654. 
231. See 42 U.S.C. § 11432(h)(1) (Supp. IV 2011) (funding educational 
activities for children and youth who have become homeless as a result 
of foreclosure). 
232. For the most prominent exception, see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006), 
which allows the discharge of student loan debt on the basis of “undue 
hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents.” A debtor’s status 
as the parent of minor children is also relevant, albeit indirectly, to 
whether the debtor can file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. A debtor can be 
precluded from Chapter 7 bankruptcy if his or her monthly income, 
minus certain reasonable or actual monthly expenses, exceeds a certain 
amount. See id. § 707. In calculating the debtor’s expenses, courts are 
directed to consider certain expenses for dependents, including 
dependent children. See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV). Here, the goal of 
considering the debtor’s parental status seems not to protect children 
from hardship, but to determine with accuracy the debtor’s reasonable 
expenses. 
233. See John M. Czarnetzky, The Individual and Failure: A Theory of the 
Bankruptcy Discharge, 32 Ariz. St. L.J. 393, 449–50 (2000) (noting 
that prepetition waiver of the right to discharge in bankruptcy is 
unenforceable, even if knowing and voluntary on the part of the debtor). 
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a discharge in bankruptcy ensures that “no matter what a man’s 
contractual obligations, he will not be disabled from supporting 
himself and his family at some reasonable level.”234 But the reference 
to children is here, as typically, oblique, folded within the more 
general category of “family” or “dependents.”235 There is no suggestion 
that the protections of bankruptcy should be made more readily 
available when children’s interests are at stake. And despite the 
general sense that bankruptcy law serves to protect dependents, there 
is very little discussion of the reasons for protecting children in 
particular, who—as bankruptcy expert Thomas Jackson conceded in a 
rare, and footnoted, exception to the scholarly tendency to overlook 
the issues of children and the distinct set of problems that they 
pose—cannot themselves negotiate with a caretaking adult to protect 
their interests when making credit decisions.236 
While bankruptcy law does not consider children’s interests in 
determining whether to extend its protections in the first instance,237 
there are a number of ways in which the operation of bankruptcy law 
does countenance, and to some extent protect, the needs of children. 
For instance, bankruptcy law protects child and parent creditors by 
providing that domestic support obligations are not dischargeable in 
bankruptcy.238 Children are also protected by homestead exemption 
laws,239 which protect children by keeping the family home—or some 
 
234. Fried, supra note 175, at 108. 
235. See also, e.g., Conrad K. Cyr, Setting the Record Straight for a 
Comprehensive Revision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 49 Am. Bankr. 
L.J. 99, 150–52 (1975) (advocating reforms to consumer bankruptcy law 
in order to better protect “young families” from “economic collapse”); 
Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification for 
Financial Rehabilitation of the Consumer Debtor, 48 Wash. & Lee L. 
Rev. 515, 537 (1991) (characterizing bankruptcy law as driven by the 
notion that “[t]he family unit should not suffer the consequences of 
financial mistakes in which it did not directly participate”).  
236. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 
Harv. L. Rev. 1393, 1419 n.82 (1985) (excepting children from the 
argument that dependents are generally well-positioned to ensure that 
the people they depend on for support consider their interests when 
making credit decisions). 
237. A prominent exception to this is the discharge of student loan debt, 
which is available upon a showing of undue hardship to a debtor and 
the debtor’s dependents. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006). 
238. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2006); see also Kristin Brandser Kalsem, 
Bankruptcy Reform and the Financial Well-Being of Women: How 
Intersectionality Matters in Money Matters, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 1181, 
1202–10 (2006) (discussing legislative concern with protecting women 
and children who are owed spousal and child support by debtors filing 
for bankruptcy). 
239. See Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal 
Mythology of Home, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1093, 1100–01, 1115–18 (2009) 
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portion of its value—out of the reach of creditors.240 Traditionally, the 
homestead exemption was available only to heads of families, which 
was often interpreted as requiring that the debtor claiming the 
exemption had dependents in need of support.241 Today, while most 
jurisdictions provide a homestead exemption to all individuals,242 a few 
limit homestead protections to those with dependents,243 and others 
provide greater protections (typically, a greater exemption amount) for 
those with dependents.244 The homestead exemption laws thus seem 
designed, in part, to protect children from the financial vicissitudes of 
their parents. 
Children are also taken into account in the formulas by which 
bankruptcy law calculates how much income certain debtors should 
be able to exempt from repayment in order to fulfill their basic needs. 
Thus, a debtor who files for Chapter 13 bankruptcy is required, when 
a trustee or unsecured creditor objects to confirmation of a proposed 
bankruptcy plan, to comply with a requirement that all of the 
“debtor’s projected disposable income” be devoted to paying 
 
(describing homestead exemption laws and noting that they are often 
justified as protecting children from dislocation, while disputing as an 
empirical matter that children suffer psychological harm when parents 
lose their homes). 
240. Some states protect the family home in its entirety from the reach of 
creditors. See, e.g., Fla. Const. art. 10, § 4. But others protect as little 
as $5,000 of the value of the family home. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 6-10-2 
(LexisNexis 2005) (limiting homestead exemption to $5,000); W. Va. 
Code Ann. § 38-9-1 (LexisNexis 2011) (same). 
241. See Alison D. Morantz, There’s No Place Like Home: Homestead 
Exemption and Judicial Constructions of Family in Nineteenth-Century 
America, 24 Law & Hist. Rev. 245, 245 (2006) (discussing changing 
judicial interpretation of head of family status in the context of 
nineteenth-century homestead exemption laws). 
242. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 6-10-2 (LexisNexis 2005) (“The homestead of 
every resident of this state, with the improvements and appurtenances, 
not exceeding in value $5,000 and in area 160 acres, shall be . . . exempt 
from levy and sale under execution or other process for the collection of 
debts during his or her life and occupancy . . . .”). 
243. See, e.g., W. Va. Code Ann. § 38-9-1 (LexisNexis 2011) (“Any 
husband, wife, parent or other head of a household residing in this State 
. . . owning a homestead shall by operation of law have a homestead 
exemption . . . .”). 
244. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 704.730 (West Supp. 2012) 
(providing homestead exemption in the amount of $75,000, but raising 
exemption to $100,000 where either debtor or debtor’s spouse is a 
member of a “family unit”); id. § 704.710(b)(2) (West 2009) (defining 
“family unit” as including the debtor along with a minor child that the 
debtor or the debtor’s spouse “cares for or maintains in the 
homestead”). 
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unsecured creditors under the plan.245 In calculating the projected 
disposable income of a debtor, the court will deduct expenses that are 
“reasonably necessary” for “the maintenance or support of the debtor 
or a dependent of the debtor,”246 and in so doing will consider factors 
such as special circumstances giving rise to the need for a debtor’s 
child to have a private-school education.247 Here, however, it is not 
clear that bankruptcy law sets out to protect children, so much as to 
obtain an accurate calculation of each debtor’s reasonable expenses. 
Moreover, recent changes in bankruptcy law have tightened the 
restrictions on the child-related expenses that certain parent-debtors 
can exempt from their projected disposable income under the rubric of 
“reasonably necessary” expenses. Where a debtor has an above-
median income, courts must now calculate the debtor’s projected 
disposable income under a formula that, rather than allow courts to 
determine, as formerly, the expenses that are reasonably necessary for 
any given child,248 limits exemption for children’s private school 
expenses, for instance, to $1,775 per year.249  
Some have recently begun to advocate that bankruptcy law address 
more directly the plight of debtors with dependent children.250 Most 
 
245. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b). 
246. § 1325(b)(2)(A)(i). 
247. See, e.g., In re Webb, 262 B.R. 685, 687, 690–91 (Bankr. E.D. Texas 
2001) (holding that $550 per month to pay for private school was a 
reasonably necessary expense, given the child’s special needs). 
248. See id. 
249. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3) (2006) (directing that amounts “reasonably 
necessary to be expended” under § 1325(b)(2)(A)(i) be determined in 
accordance with § 707(b)(2) if the debtor’s income is greater than the 
median income of the applicable state); id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) 
(“[D]ebtor’s monthly expenses may include the actual expenses for each 
dependent child less than 18 years of age, not to exceed $1,775 per year 
per child, to attend a private or public elementary or secondary school if 
the debtor provides documentation of such expenses and a detailed 
explanation of why such expenses are reasonable and necessary . . . .”). 
250. See, e.g., Eric S. Nguyen, Parents in Financial Crisis: Fighting to Keep 
the Family Home, 82 Am. Bankr. L.J. 229 (2008) (providing empirical 
evidence that parents are more likely than childless debtors to file for 
bankruptcy in order to save their homes, and arguing that bankruptcy 
law should enable courts to provide heightened homeownership 
protection to debtors with children); Elizabeth Warren, The New 
Economics of the American Family, 12 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 1, 
27–37 (2004) (arguing for changes to bankruptcy law to better address 
the increasing financial distress of middle class families with children). 
Some have also made the related argument that consumer credit 
regulation fails to sufficiently protect children from the harm that 
accompanies their parents’ financial distress, and should be reformed 
accordingly. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making 
Credit Safer, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 58–61 (2008).  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012 
Beyond Family Law 
351 
prominently, Elizabeth Warren has shown that families with children 
are significantly more likely to go into bankruptcy than other families, 
and contends that this is because those with children bear greater 
economic risks than their childless counterparts.251 Warren argues that 
we should consider how bankruptcy law might better protect children 
from the financial distress of their parents, for instance by imposing 
greater limits on creditors who attempt to repossess family homes or 
cars.252 As Warren observes, “the bankruptcy system offers a vision 
deep into our collective values,” including our valuation of families and 
of child rearing.253 
But Warren’s attention to children’s interests is the exception 
rather than the rule. Even this exceptional attention to children’s 
interests, moreover, tends to be limited to certain heavily regulated 
areas of law that overlap with contract law, such as foreclosure law 
and bankruptcy. In more general scholarly discussions of the limits of 
contract enforcement, while there is extensive commentary on the 
relevance of children’s interests to the enforceability of agreements 
that affect them directly, such as surrogacy contracts, there is no 
mention of even the possibility that children’s interests be taken into 
account when enforcing contracts by their parents that have no direct 
bearing on the children, but might well affect their lives nonetheless. 
III. The Autonomy-Developing Rationale Across the 
Legal Canon 
Currently, the arguments for taking children’s interests into 
account in cases involving their parents—to the extent that scholars 
recognize the issue at all—have reached a stalemate. Framed within 
the confines of each doctrinal field, these debates are either overly 
narrow, as in contract law’s limited understanding of which 
agreements affect children, or undertheorized, as in the parental 
incarceration debate within criminal law. Moreover, the issue of 
children’s interests is largely marginalized within each field, and 
receives little attention in general scholarly accounts of each field’s 
underlying rationale. No scholar has recognized the connection 
between the law’s treatment of a child’s parents, on the one hand, 
and, on the other, how each doctrinal area will treat the child upon 
reaching adulthood—a connection that makes children’s interests an 
essential component of any discussion of each field’s legitimacy. 
This Article reframes the issue of children’s interests in cases 
involving their parents—and argues for the central importance of 
 
251. Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupt Children, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 1003, 1010–14, 
1020–22 (2002). 
252. Id. at 1024. 
253. Id. at 1025. 
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these interests across the legal canon—by importing into the 
discussion the perspective of family law about why and how childhood 
matters. Family law’s insight about the influence of childhood on the 
adult self has shown, in Parts I and II, the extent to which children’s 
development can be affected by cases involving their parents. The 
Article now brings this insight to bear on the related question of why 
we should take children’s interests into account in these cases. When 
viewed in light of the formative influence of childhood experience, 
children’s interests can be seen as integral to—rather than collateral 
to—the two exemplary areas of law we are examining, criminal law 
and contract law. As this Article will now demonstrate, both of these 
areas of law are premised on a model of the adult legal subject that is 
closely intertwined with the conditions of each child’s development. 
This is the model of the adult legal actor as sufficiently autonomous, 
in the sense of both rational and free, to be held responsible for his or 
her actions. 
From the perspective of the autonomy assumption, considering 
the effect on children of legal decisions involving their parents no 
longer seems at odds with the overarching concerns of criminal law, 
contract law, or many of the other doctrinal areas of law in which 
children’s interests are indirectly at stake. For according to family 
law’s best-interests-of-the-child assessment, the likelihood that each 
child will actually develop into a rational and independent adult—and 
thus will resemble the model of the autonomous legal actor taken for 
granted across the legal canon—is greatly influenced by the conditions 
of each child’s upbringing and early experience. Thus, attending to 
children’s interests in cases that affect them indirectly can be seen as 
contributing to the legitimacy and internal consistency of any area of 
law that predicates responsibility on adult autonomy. Considering 
how legal outcomes affect children’s upbringing will enhance the 
legitimacy of these areas of law by increasing the likelihood that the 
children will grow up to resemble what the law will later assume them 
to be—autonomous adults capable of acting rationally and exercising 
freedom of choice.  
A. The Autonomy Premise in Criminal Law 
A central debate in criminal law is the degree of autonomy that a 
person must possess in order to be held responsible for his or her 
actions. Because criminal law brings the power of the state to bear on 
individuals more severely than any other area of law, legal 
philosophers are especially concerned that individuals not be held 
criminally liable unless they can be blamed for their actions.254 
 
254. See Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the 
Criminal Law, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2245, 2280 (1992) (discussing the 
connection between blame and criminal punishment, and noting that 
“[t]he criminal law is the most visible and explicit institutional setting 
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Despite disagreement about the proper basis of criminal punishment, 
there is a widespread consensus that blameworthy conduct requires a 
minimal degree of autonomy, in the form of both rationality and 
freedom of choice.255 In the formulation of H.L.A. Hart, in order to be 
held criminally responsible, a legal actor must possess both the 
capacity (rationality) and the opportunity (freedom of choice) to 
conform her behavior to the law.256  
This twofold requirement for criminal responsibility is reflected in 
the substantive provisions of criminal law, which are predicated on a 
minimal degree of autonomy in the form of rationality and freedom of 
choice. Criminal liability typically requires both a mens rea (culpable 
state of mind)257 and an actus reus (a voluntary act or omission).258 
The mens rea component emphasizes that criminal responsibility 
requires a degree of rational choice. If a legal actor is unaware of the 
facts that made his actions unlawful, for instance, he may lack the 
requisite mens rea.259 The higher the degree of rational activity, the 
more culpable a person may be for the same underlying conduct. It is 
for this reason that premeditation, deliberation, and intent have 
traditionally distinguished first-degree murder from lesser charges.260 
 
for the working out of questions of individual responsibility”); Joshua 
Dressler, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New 
Excuses and the Model Penal Code, 19 Rutgers L.J. 671, 681 (1988) 
(“[T]he criminal law is premised on the belief that wrongdoers should 
not be punished in the absence of moral desert.”); Lloyd L. Weinreb, 
Desert, Punishment, and Criminal Responsibility, 49 Law & Contemp. 
Probs., Summer 1986, at 47, 79 (“Punishment follows directly from 
desert because only if desert is fulfilled can we be regarded fully as 
persons—free, morally responsible, and deserving—at all.”).  
255. See Abramowicz, supra note 145, at 843–46 (summarizing debates about 
the nexus between autonomy and criminal responsibility). 
256. See H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 181 (1968). 
257. See Model Penal Code § 2.02(1) (1985) (“Except as provided in 
Section 2.05, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted 
purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, 
with respect to each material element of the offense.”). 
258. See id. § 2.01(1) (“A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability 
is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the omission to 
perform an act of which he is physically capable.”). 
259. See Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 
1091, 1107 (1985) (“Ignorance . . . should be regarded as . . . the 
negation of these forms of mens rea.”). 
260. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 189 (Deering Supp. 2012) (defining 
murder in the first degree as including “willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated killing”); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-303 (2008) (“A person 
commits murder in the first degree if he or she kills another person . . . 
purposely and with deliberate and premeditated malice . . . .”). But see 
2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 14.1(a) (2d ed. 
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The actus reus requirement adds to this the mandate that conduct be 
volitional if it is to become the basis for criminal responsibility. There 
is no actus reus, and therefore no crime, for instance, where conduct is 
the result of an involuntary spasm, or where the actor is 
unconscious.261 
Criminal law’s twofold autonomy requirement is also reflected in 
the major excuses from criminal liability, such as insanity and 
duress.262 The insanity defense makes sufficient rationality a 
prerequisite to criminal responsibility. Under every version of the 
insanity defense, an actor is excused if he lacked the capacity to 
understand either the nature or the wrongfulness of his actions.263 The 
duress excuse, in turn, conveys that criminal responsibility requires a 
certain degree of free choice.264 A person who acts with a gun to his 
head is not responsible because he did not act with sufficient freedom: 
he had some volition, but his range of choices—obey the gunman or 
face death—was too limited to merit criminal liability.  
Even as criminal law mandates autonomy as the basis for criminal 
responsibility, however, legal philosophers have long acknowledged 
that we often hold actors legally responsible for their conduct in the 
absence of full autonomy. On the one hand, the legitimacy of criminal 
law rests on the assumption that we only inflict punishment on those 
who acted with sufficient autonomy to merit blame for their actions. 
At the same time, however, criminal law presumes that all minimally 
competent adults meet this standard of autonomy. In the process, we 
hold liable a number of adults whose rational capacity and freedom of 
choice are significantly impaired. 
This wrinkle in criminal law’s autonomy requirement is visible in 
the debate over an excuse for criminal behavior that has been widely 
rejected by courts and scholars: the “Rotten Social Background” 
excuse. In the 1970s, Professor Richard Delgado, building upon the 
work of Judge David Bazelon, proposed that we excuse from criminal 
liability those who have been brought up in conditions that have 
diminished their capacity to deliberate rationally and to regulate their 
 
2003) (describing shift away from requiring premeditation as an element 
of murder). 
261. See Model Penal Code § 2.01(2)(a) (listing types of acts that are not 
“voluntary” within the meaning of the “voluntary act” requirement for 
criminal liability); see also Markus D. Dubber, Legitimating Penal Law, 
28 Cardozo L. Rev. 2597, 2609 (2007) (linking both mens rea and 
actus reus requirements to criminal law’s insistence on autonomy as a 
prerequisite for criminal responsibility). 
262. See 2 LaFave, supra note 260, § 9.1(a)(4) (discussing excuses from 
criminal liability). 
263. See 1 id. § 7.1 (discussing insanity defense).  
264. See 2 id. § 9.7 (discussing the defense of duress). 
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emotions.265 The proposed “Rotten Social Background” defense 
concerned adults who met the minimum standard of capacity that 
rendered them liable under criminal law—they understood the nature 
of their actions, and acted with a degree of volition—but who had 
experienced a difficult childhood that led to significant difficulty in 
conforming their behavior to the law.266 Such a defendant, Delgado 
argued, should not bear responsibility for actions that resulted from 
an early upbringing and environment that had been inflicted on him 
through no fault of his own.267 
Most criminal law scholars and legal philosophers reject the 
prospect of a “Rotten Social Background” excuse even while 
acknowledging that upbringing and early experience can diminish a 
legal actor’s ability to avoid wrongdoing.268 These scholars recognize 
that childhood background can impair the two elements of autonomy, 
rationality and self-control, and in so doing can lead adult actors to 
engage in conduct that they might have avoided had they been raised 
in a different environment.269 But they argue that as long as adult 
 
265. See Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”: Should the Criminal 
Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 Law 
& Ineq. 9 (1985); United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 959–60 
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting in part) (finding that trial 
court improperly instructed jury on testimony concerning defendant’s 
“rotten social background,” where expert testified that this background 
made it difficult for defendant to control his conduct, and the judge 
instructed the jury that “[w]e are not concerned with a question of 
whether or not a man had a rotten social background” but only with 
whether defendant was mentally ill); David L. Bazelon, The Morality of 
Criminal Law, 49 S. Cal. L. Rev. 385, 388 (1976) (arguing that we 
should not convict those who engage in proscribed conduct unless 
“society’s own conduct in relation to the actor entitles it to sit in 
condemnation of him with respect to the condemnable act” (footnote 
omitted)). 
266. See Delgado, supra note 265, at 65; Alexander, 471 F.2d at 960 (“The 
thrust of [the defendant’s] defense was that the environment in which he 
was raised—his ‘rotten social background’—conditioned him to respond 
to certain stimuli in a manner most of us would consider flagrantly 
inappropriate.”). 
267. See Delgado, supra note 265, at 54 (“In some cases, a defendant’s 
impoverished background so greatly determines his or her criminal 
behavior that we feel it unfair to punish the individual.”). 
268. See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated 
Review, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 943, 961 (1999) (describing widespread 
rejection of the proposed “Rotten Social Background” defense). 
269. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 259, at 1130–31 (recognizing that criminal 
conduct can be caused by character traits created by upbringing and 
early environment); Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved 
Punishment: An Essay on Choice, Character, and Responsibility, 67 
Ind. L.J. 719, 720 (1992) (criminal responsibility should not depend 
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actors meet a minimal standard of capacity270—such as possessing the 
ability to understand the nature and wrongfulness of their actions, 
which in most jurisdictions establishes legal sanity—we should act on 
the premise that adults are autonomous, and hold them responsible 
accordingly, instead of assessing the extent to which they fall short of 
actual autonomy.271 
There are a number of reasons for criminal law to treat adults as if 
they are autonomous, even when they are not. As a pragmatic matter, 
once we begin excusing adults from liability on the basis that their 
capacity to refrain from wrongdoing has been diminished by experiences 
beyond their control, we open up the argument that no one can be held 
responsible for his or her actions, because all of us are determined by 
some combination of genetics and environment.272 Another argument is 
that recognizing the extent to which certain sane adults fall short of full 
autonomy would diminish the dignity of those adults,273 with 
potentially pernicious results: were we to treat certain adults as 
children who cannot control their actions, their rights and liberties 
could be curtailed accordingly.274 Still others argue that we must treat 
adults as autonomous because the assumption of adult autonomy is 
 
upon whether unchosen influences diminished a legal actor’s ability to 
“freely choose” to engage in criminal conduct). 
270. See Moore, supra note 259, at 1149 (arguing that a minimal ability to 
engage in “practical reasoning” should suffice to render an adult legal 
actor criminally responsible). 
271. For a more extended discussion of the autonomy premise in criminal 
law, see Abramowicz, supra note 145, at 843–57. 
272. See Weinreb, supra note 254, at 77 (“The criminal law departs from 
convention in order not to undermine the conventional basis of desert 
altogether, by calling into question whether a person can ever truly be 
said to have acted with freedom and responsibility despite the 
determinate conditions of his existence.”); Joshua Dressler, Reflections 
on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the Model 
Penal Code, 19 Rutgers L.J. 671, 680 (1988) (noting that “science . . . is 
increasingly forcing us to acknowledge the unhappy conclusion that 
human behavior is caused by many factors, some inherent and others 
social, over which we have no control”). 
273. See Moore, supra note 259, at 1147 (“To stand back and to refuse to 
judge because one understands the causes of criminal behavior . . . 
betokens a refusal to acknowledge the equal moral dignity of others.”); 
Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to 
Judge Bazelon, 49 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1247, 1267–68 (1976) (“[T]he law’s 
presumption of responsibility . . . treats all persons as autonomous and 
capable of that most human capacity, the capacity to choose. To treat 
persons otherwise is to treat them as less than human.”). 
274. See Morse, supra note 273, at 1257, 1262 (arguing that excusing 
defendants on the basis that their criminal conduct was determined by 
their background could lead to repressive results, such as preventive 
detention, forced therapy, and an intrusive “therapeutic state”). 
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necessary to provide “meaning in life” and to “construct a normative 
order in a world otherwise indifferent to human norms.”275 
Underlying these arguments is a broad consensus that the 
criminal law must take adult autonomy for granted and assign 
liability accordingly, rather than investigate the extent to which each 
adult legal actor is truly autonomous in the sense of possessing both 
rational capacity and full freedom of choice. We do so because, for our 
system of criminal law to function, we need to operate on the 
assumption that most adult legal actors can, and should, be held 
responsible for their actions. As Herbert Packer put it in his 
discussion of criminal liability, “the law treats man’s conduct as 
autonomous and willed, not because it is, but because it is desirable 
to proceed as if it were.”276 
B. Autonomy as Premise and as Goal in Contract Law 
Autonomy is also a central concern of contract law. In criminal 
law, as we saw, autonomy is relevant to whether a defendant acted 
with sufficient moral agency to justify the imposition of punishment. 
The stakes in contract law are not as high—the losing party to a 
contract dispute faces loss of money or property, not of liberty or 
life—and therefore contract law does not exhibit the same fraught 
preoccupation as criminal law with precisely the degree of individual 
autonomy necessary to render a person legally responsible. But 
contract law, as well, depends on the assumption that the legal actors 
on whom the power of the state is brought to bear acted with 
sufficient autonomy to justify state action. 
In contract law, autonomy functions, in somewhat circular 
fashion, as both justifying premise and normative goal. The defining 
feature of contract law is that it enforces agreements that have been 
voluntarily entered into. Thus, in theory, contract law brings the 
power of the state to bear only upon those who have deliberately 
invited the state to intervene in their affairs and have themselves set 
the terms of this intervention. Moreover, insofar as contractual 
obligations are freely assumed, their enforcement is seen as enhancing 
the autonomy of the contracting parties. The argument, in short, is 
that as long as contracting parties are autonomous, enforcing their 
agreements will make them more so. 
Individual autonomy was especially important to classical 
contract doctrine, in particular its ethos of freedom of contract, under 
which courts shifted from policing the fairness of bargains to enforcing 
whatever agreements the parties arranged amongst themselves.277 As 
 
275. Pillsbury, supra note 269, at 721. 
276. Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 74–75 
(1968). 
277. See Atiyah, supra note 175, at 402–05. 
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long as parties to a contract were autonomous adults, in the sense of 
both rational and free, then freedom of contract, it was argued, would 
facilitate freedom more generally.278 The decline of classical contract 
theory, and its replacement by a more regulatory approach to 
contract law, was the result, in part, of criticism of autonomy as both 
premise and goal of contract law. As contract scholars began to 
observe the extent to which contracting parties often fall short of the 
ideal of autonomous choice, it became more difficult to argue that 
freedom of contract necessarily facilitates the free and rational choices 
of the contracting parties.279 At the same time, many began to argue 
that contract law does, and should, promote values other than 
autonomy, such as efficiency280 or distributive justice.281 Today, 
autonomy contract theorists are outnumbered by efficiency contract 
theorists, who argue, as both a normative and a descriptive matter, 
that contract law functions primarily to promote the efficient 
distribution of resources.282  
Nonetheless, autonomy continues to be one of the major 
theoretical approaches to contract law. The most prominent 
proponent of the autonomy approach to contract law is Charles Fried, 
who in Contract as Promise revived the argument of classical 
contract doctrine that enforcement of promises is necessary to respect 
the autonomy of the promisor.283 Fried begins by exploring the moral 
basis of contractual obligation and concludes that “[t]he obligation to 
keep a promise is grounded not in arguments of utility but in respect 
 
278. See, e.g., A.V. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation Between Law 
and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth Century 
189 (1905) (attributing the “extension of individual liberty” in England 
from 1825 to 1870 to “freedom of contract” principles); Maine, supra 
note 174, at 169 (characterizing the rise of “Contract” as having created 
“a phase of social order in which all . . . relations arise from the free 
agreement of Individuals.”). 
279. See Atiyah, supra note 175, at 231–37. 
280. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An 
Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 Yale L.J. 1261, 1263–64 
(1980) (arguing for a wealth-maximizing understanding of contract law). 
281. See Kronman, supra note 179, at 474 (“[R]ules of contract law should be 
used to implement distributional goals whenever alternative ways of 
doing so are likely to be more costly or intrusive.”). 
282. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the 
Philosophy of Promising, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 489, 491 (1989) (contending 
that autonomy theories cannot help to determine the proper content of 
default rules); see generally Trebilcock, supra note 207, at 8 
(evaluating the competing claims of the autonomy approach to contracts 
and the efficiency, or welfare-maximizing, approach). 
283. Fried, supra note 175. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012 
Beyond Family Law 
359 
for individual autonomy and in trust.”284 Randy Barnett further 
developed the importance of autonomy to contract law with his 
consent-based theory of contracts.285 While Barnett grounds contract 
enforcement not on the morality of promising, but on the fact of 
consent, his approach shares with Fried’s a concern with individual 
autonomy.286 More recently, some contracts scholars, such as Nathan 
Oman and Jody Kraus, have argued for integrating the autonomy 
approach with the efficiency approach to contract law.287 
Autonomy comes into play in efficiency theories of contract as 
well, as premise if not as goal. Efficiency theorists argue that contract 
law should seek to maximize individual welfare, and that this is often 
best achieved by enforcing the free choices of the contracting parties, 
which presumably reflect their values and preferences.288 Under this 
view, for contract law to achieve the goal of efficiency, the agreements 
it enforces must indeed be the product of autonomous choice.289 
Contract law’s emphasis on individual autonomy is visible in the 
defenses to contractual enforcement. Many of these are premised on 
 
284 Id. at 16. 
285. See Barnett, supra note 175, at 270 (“Consent is the moral component 
that distinguishes valid from invalid transfer of alienable rights.”). 
286. See id. at 319 (“A consent theory’s concern with the issue of individual 
will and autonomy is reflected in the manner by which consent is 
determined—the theory looks for a manifestation of intention to be 
legally bound.”). 
287. See Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract 
Law: The Vertical Integration Strategy, 11 Phil. Issues 420, 421–22 
(2001) (explaining how efficiency and autonomy theories of contract law 
can be “combined as logically distinct components of a unified theory” 
by “preserving the most defensible claims, and subordinating or 
abandoning the weakest claims, of each kind of theory”); Nathan B. 
Oman, The Failure of Economic Interpretations of the Law of Contract 
Damages, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 829, 829 (2007) (arguing for a 
unified approach in which autonomy determines the basic structure of 
contract law and efficiency fills out the details).  
288. See Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 13 (40th 
anniversary ed. 2002) (asserting that a welfare-maximizing approach to 
contract law requires that “the transaction is bi-laterally voluntary and 
informed”); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the 
Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 
487, 497 (“The system of wealth maximization consists of institutions 
that facilitate, or where that is infeasible approximate, the operations of 
a free market and thus maximize autonomous, utility-seeking 
behavior.”). 
289. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of 
Contract, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 211, 212 (1995) (noting that efficiency 
theory relies on “the empirical premise that in making a bargain a 
contracting party will act with full cognition to rationally maximize his 
subjective expected utility”). 
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defects in the two components of autonomy that we discussed in the 
context of criminal responsibility: volition and rational capacity.290 In 
the lack-of-volition category are excuses such as duress and undue 
influence.291 Here, contract law refuses to enforce contracts that are 
the product of a power imbalance that makes the choice to enter into 
the contract insufficiently voluntary.292 Contract excuses in the lack-
of-rationality category include mutual mistake and impracticability.293 
The defense of mutual mistake prevents contract enforcement in 
certain situations where the contracting parties lacked the information 
necessary to rationally assess the benefits of entering into the 
contract, whereas impracticability denies enforcement in certain 
situations where a contracting party has made an inaccurate 
calculation of the costs of performing as promised.294 These defenses to 
contract enforcement, then, attempt to ensure that autonomy holds 
true as a premise of contract law, by refusing to enforce contracts 
made by parties who lacked sufficient volition or rationality to make 
an autonomous choice.  
The two components of autonomy, rationality and volition, are 
also behind the contractual rules of incapacity. Contracts can be 
voided for lack of capacity, for instance on the basis of infancy or 
mental incompetence.295 The theory is that those who are 
incapacitated for these reasons lack a sufficient degree of autonomy to 
form a binding contract because they lack a fully developed ability to 
make rational choices and at the same time are unusually susceptible 
to pressure from others.296 The incapacity defense is central to the 
 
290. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
291. See Farnsworth, supra note 176, §§ 4.16–4.21. 
292. See Trebilcock, supra note 207, at 78–101 (discussing “the 
preconditions to voluntary consent” in the case of a contractual 
transaction and noting that “[t]his issue is deeply problematic, if only 
because of the pervasiveness of scarcity, which renders all choices 
constrained choices”).  
293. See Farnsworth, supra note 176, § 9; see also Trebilcock, supra 
note 207, at 103 (“[H]ow much information is required for the exercise of 
autonomous choices presents a complex puzzle: it is difficult to conceive 
of a choice as autonomous without basic information on its implications, 
but . . . it may be rational to choose to forgo the acquisition of further 
information where its expected benefits are less than its expected 
costs.”). 
294. See Trebilcock, supra note 207, at 127–46 (discussing mutual mistake, 
impracticability, and other contract defenses related to “symmetric 
information imperfections”).  
295. See Farnsworth, supra note 176, §§ 4.2–4.6. 
296. See Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, Inc., 158 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Wis. 1968) 
(allowing a minor to disaffirm the purchase of an automobile under 
infancy doctrine, and explaining that “the minor [i]s immature in both 
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claim of contract theorists—and in particular of freedom-of-contract 
proponents—that contract promotes individual autonomy by 
enforcing only the choices of free and rational individuals.297  
In contract law as in criminal law, a central question is where to 
draw the line in absolving adult actors of legal responsibility. In 
contract law, even more than in criminal law, this debate hinges on 
the conflict between autonomy as premise and autonomy as goal. The 
argument on one side is that we should not hold parties responsible 
for their promises where they lacked full autonomy in making them. 
The argument on the other side is that refusing to enforce contracts 
will diminish the individual autonomy that contract law is designed to 
promote, both in an expressive sense (by treating adults like children) 
and in a practical one (by making it more difficult for them to enter 
into binding agreements). 
Thus, autonomy is on both sides of the equation in one of the 
most contested issues of contract enforcement—the doctrine of 
unconscionability, which allows courts to refuse to enforce agreements 
that are substantively and procedurally unfair.298 Under the doctrine 
of freedom of contract, which rose to dominance in the late nineteenth 
century, courts that had formerly policed the fairness of bargains 
began to see their role instead as to enforce whatever agreements the 
parties had arranged amongst themselves.299 Courts continued to be 
 
mind and experience and . . . therefore . . . he should be protected from 
his own bad judgments as well as from adults who would take 
advantage of him”). See generally Farnsworth, supra note 176, §§ 4.4–
4.5 (discussing avoidance of contracts by minors). 
297. See Maine, supra note 174, at 173 (asserting that children are the 
exception that prove the rule that contract promotes freedom of choice, 
because the rule of incapacity of infants underscores the extent to which 
“the faculty of forming a judgment on [one’s] own interests” is “the first 
essential of an engagement by Contract”). 
298. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (“If the court as a matter of law finds the contract 
or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it 
was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract . . . .”); see also 
Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity’s Modification of Contract: An Analysis of 
the Twentieth Century’s Equitable Reformation of Contract Law, 33 
New Eng. L. Rev. 265, 291–92 (1999) (“An unconscionability 
determination generally revolves around a two-part formula. First, the 
court asks whether there is evidence of procedural unconscionability. 
Second, it considers whether the weakness in the bargaining process has 
resulted in a substantively unfair contract. . . . It is unclear whether a 
finding of unconscionability requires both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability.”). 
299. See Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net 
Function, 58 Ala. L. Rev. 73, 82 (2006) (“Classical contract doctrine 
did not stake its claim on contract thought until the nineteenth century. 
It was then that contracts scholars began to erode prior convictions that 
only fair exchanges warranted enforcement.”).  
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reluctant to enforce extremely unfair bargains, however, and would on 
occasion refuse enforcement on other grounds, for instance by finding 
that the terms were presumptively the product of fraud or duress.300 
By the mid-twentieth century, courts began to use the doctrine of 
unconscionability to strike down bargains that fell short of fraud, 
duress, or incapacity in the traditional sense, but where one of the 
parties agreed to unfair terms under conditions that limited the 
party’s freedom of choice or rationality, such as inequality of 
bargaining power, economic pressure, or lack of sophistication.301  
The application of unconscionability doctrine to police 
substantively unfair bargains typically occurs in the name of 
protecting historically vulnerable and oppressed groups, such as the 
poor and women. The most prominent discussions of 
unconscionability in recent years have concerned the protection of 
disadvantaged consumers (as in Williams v. Walker-Thomas 
Furniture Co., discussed above);302 vulnerable spouses, typically wives 
(as in the debate over the enforceability of prenuptial agreements);303 
and poor women (as in the debate over surrogacy agreements).304 The 
effect of using the unconscionability doctrine in these contexts, it is 
argued, is to further diminish the autonomy of these already 
disadvantaged groups by characterizing them as incompetent and 
 
300. See id. at 82–83; see also Hume v. U.S., 132 U.S. 406, 413 (1889) 
(discussing cases finding terms sufficiently unfair that “fraud was 
apparent upon the face of the contracts”). 
301. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (“Unconscionability has generally been recognized to 
include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties 
together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the 
other party.”); see also id. (“In many cases the meaningfulness of the 
choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power. The manner 
in which the contract was entered is also relevant to this consideration. 
Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or 
lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the 
contract . . . ?” (footnote omitted)). 
302. See supra text accompanying notes 219–24. 
303. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 289, at 256–57 (describing how courts 
have expanded unconscionability doctrine to encompass post-divorce 
economic injustice, regardless of whether the injustice arose at the time 
of contract formation, and arguing that such cases are better understood 
as driven by the limits of cognition). 
304. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From 
Feminist Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in 
Contract Law, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1235, 1238 (1998) ( discussing how 
surrogacy agreements pose “what feminist legal scholars know as the 
‘dilemma of choice,’ namely, the conflict between promoting women’s 
autonomy and freedom of choice on the one hand, and protecting 
women from the harmful consequences of choices made under conditions 
of inequality on the other”). 
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overriding their decisions and preferences on the basis that they are 
necessarily either irrational or coerced.305 The argument on the other 
side is that the unconscionability doctrine protects the autonomy of 
women, the poor, and other disadvantaged groups by ensuring that 
their contractual choices are made freely306 and with full 
information.307 
Those who argue for enforcing the contracts of surrogate mothers 
or hard-pressed consumers do not insist that their promises were 
necessarily made in conditions of absolute rationality and freedom of 
choice. They argue, rather, that the autonomy-enhancing effects of 
enforcing contractual promises are such that these groups, and society 
generally, will be better off if we treat most minimally competent 
adults as if they are autonomous, drawing the line only at those who 
act under certain extreme limits on their autonomy, such as cognitive 
incapacity, fraudulent misinformation, or duress.308  
Thus, in contract law as in criminal law, many scholars advocate 
an as-if approach to autonomy and individual responsibility. Under 
this approach, we treat most adult legal actors as if they are 
autonomous, and hold them to their promises accordingly, without 
inquiring into the degree to which this premise holds true.  
C. The Perspective of Family Law: Autonomy, Parenting,  
and Child Development  
Scholars within both criminal law and contract law, then, have 
devoted great attention to the premise of adult autonomy; have noted 
that this premise does not, in practice, always hold true; and have 
engaged in an often tortured debate about the problems posed by this 
 
305. See id. at 1248 (noting that those singled out for special treatment are 
“thereby . . . identified, in the logic of contract, as less competent . . . 
than the autonomous agent with whom the law ordinarily deals”); see 
also id. (proposing that we address this dilemma by reconceptualizing 
rational choice as expressive and thereby reconfiguring the basis of 
contractual obligation).  
306. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 211, at 1909–11 (describing arguments that 
surrogacy agreements should be prohibited to prevent mothers from 
being coerced by poverty to sell their children). 
307. See, e.g., Brinig, supra note 204, at 2388 (“[S]urrogacy contracts are 
suboptimal because the surrogate cannot ex ante have perfect, or even 
minimally adequate, information.”). 
308. See, e.g., Shultz, supra note 200, at 355 (arguing that the refusal to 
enforce surrogacy contracts on the basis that they are not voluntary 
treats women “as non-autonomous persons”); cf. Radin, supra note 211, 
at 1915-16 (discussing the dilemma of the “double bind,” under which 
commodification exacerbates the oppression of women by devaluing 
their personhood, but disallowing commodification prevents women from 
taking steps that they believe are preferable to remaining in their 
impoverished circumstances).  
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disjunction to each field’s legitimacy. At the same time, criminal law 
theorists have struggled to develop a coherent rationale for taking 
children’s interests into account in cases involving their parents, with 
many concluding that to do so would undermine the goals and 
legitimacy of criminal law. And contract theorists have confronted the 
issue of children’s interests as well, albeit only in the limited domain 
of familial contracts. Yet no scholar from either criminal or contract 
law has thought to link the premise of adult autonomy with the 
problem of how to treat children in cases where they are affected 
indirectly. 
When the premise of adult autonomy is considered from the 
perspective of family law, the connection between these two 
problems—the premise of autonomy when it comes to adults and the 
question of how to treat children in cases involving their parents—
becomes clear. As we saw in Part I, family law tells us that subtle 
differences in the ways children are raised can have profound effects 
on the extent of autonomy that children are able to exercise upon 
reaching adulthood. Family law looks, in particular, to how the 
variables of each parent’s environment, and of each parent’s 
continued contact with, or separation from, his or her child, can either 
facilitate or hinder the cognitive, emotional, educational, and social 
developments crucial to each child’s future ability to make free, 
rational choices as an independent adult. 
We have also seen, in Part II, the extent to which these 
determinants of children’s future autonomy can be shaped by the 
resolution of criminal or contracts cases involving parents. The 
connection between the legal treatment of parents and the 
developmental trajectory of their children is most stark in cases 
involving parental incarceration, which in most instances separates 
parents from their children. As we saw in our discussion of family 
law’s best-interests assessment, many courts consider separation of 
child from parent as inflicting particularly profound harm on a child’s 
intellectual and emotional development, with potentially devastating 
effects on a child’s adult self. Family law attempts, accordingly, to 
avoid separations of this nature whenever possible, in the name of 
protecting children’s development and future potential.  
The potential effect on children of contracts involving their 
parents is typically less devastating than that of parental incarcera-
tion, particularly with respect to ordinary commercial or consumer 
contracts that do not restructure family ties. Nonetheless, from the 
perspective of family law’s best-interests analysis, we can see that 
even non-familial contract disputes by parents can adversely affect 
their children’s development in ways that may diminish their future 
autonomy. Family-law jurisprudence acknowledges that children’s 
development may well be hindered, both educationally and emotionally, 
by the financial distress of their families. The impairment of children’s 
development is particularly severe when the financial distress entails 
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disruption of the child’s environment and diminishment of the 
parent’s own well-being and ability to function, as is often the case, 
for instance, when a parent is forced into bankruptcy or foreclosure.  
We have largely marginalized our attention to the effect of legal 
decision making on children’s development within the specialized field 
of family law. The marginalization of children’s interests within family 
law works to blind us to the contradiction between our treatment of 
children across various non-family-law fields of the legal canon and 
our assumptions in these fields regarding adults. As long as we allow 
this contradiction to stand unaddressed, it will continue to undermine 
the legitimacy of any area of law that, like both contract law and 
criminal law, treats most minimally competent adults as autonomous 
and assigns liability on that basis. 
D. Taking Children’s Interests into Account in Cases Involving  
Their Parents 
Both criminal law and contract law treat most adult legal actors 
as if they are autonomous, even in many situations where they are 
not.309 A primary argument for this as-if approach to adult autonomy 
is that it would be paternalistic to treat adults as less than fully 
capable. Paternalism, it is argued, is inappropriate when it comes to 
the treatment of adults. It diminishes their autonomy both 
practically, by overriding their decisions, and expressively, by 
conveying that they are either irrational or lacking in volition.  
The anti-paternalism argument, however, does not have the same 
power when it comes to the protection of children. Children, it is 
widely agreed, are neither as rational nor as free as adults, and thus 
require protection in many situations where adults do not. It is for 
this reason that we treat children differently from adults in cases 
involving them directly. Children are not liable for crimes in many 
instances where an adult would be, because they lack the requisite 
cognitive ability and freedom of choice to merit criminal 
responsibility.310 Similarly, children are not bound by their promises 
to the same extent that adults are, because they lack the cognitive 
and volitional capacity to give proper contractual consent.311 
The law thus recognizes that children lack the autonomy of adults 
and often exempts them from liability accordingly. But there is little 
discussion, outside of family law, of the interaction between legal 
decision making, child development, and the degree of autonomy that 
 
309. See supra Part II.A–B. 
310. But see Cynthia V. Ward, Punishing Children in the Criminal Law, 82 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 429, 429–42 (2006) (discussing recent trend 
toward treating children as adults when charged with particularly 
serious offenses, and noting the scholarly opposition to this trend). 
311. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
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a child will exercise upon becoming an adult. And children’s future 
autonomy is almost never discussed in connection with cases that 
affect them indirectly, by affecting their parents or caretakers. Yet, as 
we have seen, cases that affect children’s parents, whether by 
incarcerating them or by changing their financial fortunes, will often 
affect children themselves.312 And the effect on children of such cases 
is often to impede their development in ways that will limit the 
degree of autonomy they will exercise upon reaching adulthood.  
The perspective of the autonomy premise turns on its head the 
prevailing arguments against taking children’s interests into account 
in cases involving their parents in the area of criminal law, and shows 
the blind spot of scholars in other areas of law who fail to address the 
issue at all. The very same rationales that militate against treating 
adults as less than fully responsible for their actions—that adults are 
best treated as if they are autonomous—argue in favor of protecting 
children. Children not only lack autonomy, but are engaged in a 
developmental process that will determine the extent of autonomy 
they enjoy in the future. Children who are adversely affected by a 
criminal or a contract case involving their parents bear no 
responsibility for the situation they find themselves in. Despite this, 
they may well find their future autonomy diminished as a result of 
the legal action taken against their parents. If the law is going to 
treat children as autonomous upon reaching adulthood, it must also 
recognize its own role in shaping the conditions in which children are 
raised, and thus influencing—and perhaps diminishing—the likelihood 
that the children will become free and rational adults who deserve to 
be held responsible for their actions. 
IV. Model for Assessing When to Take  
Children’s Interests into Account 
A. Introduction 
This Article has established that taking children’s interests into 
account will improve the consistency and legitimacy of areas of law 
that are premised on a model of the autonomous adult legal actor. By 
attending to the ways in which legal decisions might harm a child’s 
future autonomy, areas of law that take adult autonomy for granted 
will contribute to their legitimacy by making it more likely—or at 
least not making it less likely—that this premise will hold true.  
That there is good reason to attend to children’s future 
autonomy, however, does not mean that it necessarily makes sense for 
the law to do so in every case, or at the expense of countervailing 
considerations. To protect children’s future autonomy at all costs 
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would undermine the goals of most areas of law, including the goal of 
promoting autonomy.  
Where, then, do we draw the line? There is already extensive 
discussion of where to draw the line in cases involving children 
directly, such as those where a child is charged with a crime.313 At the 
other end of the spectrum, this Article will leave for future discussions 
whether and how to take children’s interests into account in every 
legal case that might affect them in some way. Instead, this Article 
narrows its inquiry to a distinct subset of cases that affect children 
indirectly—those involving children’s parents—and assesses whether 
and to what extent it makes sense to take children’s interests into 
account in such cases. 
This Article will conclude by presenting a general model for 
assessing both when and how to take children’s interests into account 
in cases involving their parents. The model is intended to be 
applicable to any area of law in which children are potentially affected 
by such cases. It entails three steps, which together provide a 
mechanism for determining whether it makes sense to take children’s 
interests into account in a given area of law, and, if so, how and to 
what extent those interests should be considered and balanced against 
competing concerns. The proposed model addresses several potential 
objections to taking children’s interests into account, including 
unfairness, counterproductiveness, and inefficiency. 
B. When to Take Children’s Interests into Account 
1. Step One: Evaluating Premises and Goals 
In determining whether to take children’s interests into account in 
a given area of law, we must first consider the extent to which the 
conditions of child development bear upon the premises and goals of 
that area of law. Where children may be affected by cases involving 
their parents in ways that have bearing upon the assumptions that a 
given area of law will apply to the children as adults, we have 
sufficient reason to proceed with our analysis and to consider taking 
children’s interests into account. 
The two areas of law we have examined, criminal law and 
contract law, are both premised on an assumption of adult 
autonomy.314 As we have seen, both criminal and contract law treat 
minimally competent adults as autonomous and assign liability on 
that basis, even where a legal actor is, in reality, less than fully 
autonomous. We have seen, as well, that both criminal and contract 
cases involving parents can affect children’s development in ways that 
will either facilitate or hinder children’s future capacity for 
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autonomy.315 Thus, taking children’s interests into account in such 
cases can be viewed as enhancing the legitimacy of both fields by 
making the autonomy presumption more of a reality. Similarly, 
consideration of children’s interests would be merited in any other 
area of law that takes adult autonomy for granted. 
While this Article has focused on the premise of adult autonomy, 
there may also be a strong rationale for taking children’s interests 
into account in fields that do not share this premise. To begin with, 
even where a given field does not presume that adults are 
autonomous, the fact of adult autonomy may well contribute, on an 
instrumental level, to achieving the goals of that area of law. 
Consider, for instance, the deterrence rationale of criminal law. In 
order to effectively deter the population from committing crimes, 
criminal law requires that each legal actor have the capacity for 
deliberative, rational thought that will lead to weighing the benefits of 
committing any given offense against the costs of being caught and 
punished.316 A child who is brought up in a way that enhances her 
potential for autonomous, rational choice will be more likely to be 
deterred from committing crime than one who was not. From this 
perspective, promoting children’s future autonomy can be seen as 
enhancing the effectiveness of any area of law that hopes to achieve 
its goals through deterrence, or through any other mechanism of 
reasoned thought on the part of the adult population that is subject 
to its rule. 
Additionally, the family-law best-interests jurisprudence this 
Article examined in Part I makes clear that the conditions of child 
development have bearing not just upon adult autonomy, but upon 
many other aspects of adult capacity as well. Family law tells us that 
how children are raised potentially affects every facet of their adult 
selves, from intellectual capacity, emotional regulation, and educa-
tional attainments to productivity and sense of ethics.317 Thus, to 
determine the wisdom of taking children’s interests into account in a 
particular legal field, we should think broadly about the ways in 
which children’s adult capacities are potentially affected by cases 
involving their parents within that field, and about how these 
capacities may be linked to the goals and the premises of that 
doctrinal area of law. 
 
315. See supra Part II. 
316. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence 
in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing 
Its Best, 91 Geo. L.J. 949, 950–51 (2003) (contending that criminal 
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rational cost-benefit analysis—are absent). 
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In determining whether to take children’s interests into account in 
cases involving their parents within a given area of law, then, our first 
step will be to determine whether there is a potential rationale within 
that field for attending to children’s interests. This rationale will 
likely take the form of recognizing the ways in which child 
development can affect a type of adult capacity that has bearing upon 
the premises or goals of the given doctrinal field. Should we find such 
a rationale, however, this does not end our inquiry, but merely brings 
us to the second step of our analysis, which reflects the recognition 
that there may well be reasons to refrain from considering children’s 
interests despite having identified a potential rationale for doing so. 
2. Step Two: The Nature of the Parties 
The second step of the model entails determining whether the 
case at hand involves state action against individuals, or whether it 
instead involves litigation between private parties. This Section will 
both explain and demonstrate this aspect of the proposed mechanism 
for assessing when to take children’s interests into account in cases 
involving their parents. 
a. State Action Against Individuals 
Taking children’s interests into account in cases involving their 
parents is most feasible and most advisable where one of the parties is 
the state and the other is a private individual. The paradigmatic legal 
confrontation between an individual and the state occurs in criminal 
law. Criminal law involves state action at its most forceful and 
coercive, in that the state initiates the prosecution against the 
criminal defendant, and it often does so with the aim of curtailing the 
defendant’s freedom, and sometimes his or her life. By examining 
what it would look like to take children’s interests into account when 
sentencing their parents, we can think more generally about the 
advantages and disadvantages of taking children’s interests into 
account in other litigation involving state actions against individuals 
who happen to be parents. 
The state, unlike a private litigant, has an obligation to ensure 
that children are raised in conditions that will enhance, rather than 
diminish, their future autonomy. This obligation exists, at least in 
part, because the state has established a coercive system of law that 
will hold most children accountable for their actions upon entering 
adulthood, on the premise that those children have become 
autonomous legal actors who bear responsibility for what they do.318  
A further basis for the state’s obligation to attend to children’s 
conditions of development is that the state delegates parental rights 
to private families and backs these rights with the force of law. 
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Children themselves bear no responsibility for the conditions of their 
upbringing, because these conditions are necessarily involuntary—
children cannot choose their parents. Parents, of course, do bear 
responsibility for their children, but this does not negate the 
simultaneous responsibility of the state. Since the state arranges and 
enforces our current system of parent-child relationships, and will 
treat children as autonomous, and hold them responsible for their 
actions accordingly, when they become adults, the state bears a 
corresponding obligation to consider children’s future autonomy when 
taking action against their parents.319 
Cases where the state is a party, moreover, are especially likely to 
disrupt children’s lives. Disputes between private individuals that do 
not involve matters of family law or children typically involve 
monetary damages or other property rights. While the outcome of 
even ordinary commercial disputes involving a parent may affect a 
child’s upbringing,320 in many instances such disputes will have little 
or no effect on the child at all. A criminal case against a parent, on 
the other hand, is likely to have a significant adverse effect on his or 
her child, especially where the parent faces incarceration. When the 
state incarcerates an involved parent, it actively reshapes a child’s 
family in ways that can have profound effects on the child’s future 
autonomy and well-being.321 Thus, it makes sense to single out cases 
involving potentially coercive state actions as ones in which children’s 
interests should be considered. 
Finally, the state is well-positioned to take on the costs and 
burdens of protecting children’s interests. As the next Section 
addresses, imposing the costs of other people’s children on private 
litigants may in many cases be both unfair and inefficient. But the 
state is large enough to bear those costs effectively, and thus to 
respond to children’s interests without creating the sorts of 
inefficiency and counterproductiveness that can occur when the 
burden of children’s interests falls instead on private individuals and 
corporations. 
b. Litigation Between Private Parties 
Generally. Taking children’s interests into account in cases that 
affect them only indirectly is significantly more problematic in 
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litigation between private parties, such as tort actions, property 
disputes, and contract law. Insofar as an area of private law assumes 
adults to be autonomous, taking children’s interests into account in 
cases that affect them indirectly would help, in the short term, to 
make this premise more of a reality by promoting each such child’s 
future autonomy. But, as we can see by examining how this approach 
would play out in contract law, taking children’s interests into 
account in such cases would often be counterproductive. In ordinary 
commercial or consumer contract disputes involving children’s 
parents, for instance, case-by-case consideration of children’s interests 
would undermine many of the goals of contract law, such as 
autonomy, efficiency, and predictability. It would also, in the long 
run, undermine our very goal in attending to children’s interests in 
the first instance: the facilitation of conditions of child development 
most likely to produce autonomous adults. 
Take, for example, the contract this Article discussed at the 
outset: a distributorship agreement giving a parent exclusive rights to 
market a certain brand of shoes in a geographical area.322 After five 
years, the shoe manufacturer decides to end the exclusive agreement, 
which in turn will force the parent out of business. The contract is 
silent about termination, and a court must determine whether the 
manufacturer has a right to terminate the agreement. Should the 
court take into account the effect of its decision on the parent’s two 
young children?  
Regardless of the harm the children might suffer, taking their 
interests into account in an ordinary commercial dispute of this 
nature would be both inefficient and unfair. It would distort the 
ordinary mechanisms of the market to burden a business owner with 
the costs of children simply because he happens to conduct business 
with a parent. To interpret a distributorship agreement differently 
when one of the parties is a parent would give some manufacturers a 
competitive advantage over others simply because they did not have 
the misfortune to sell to a parent who becomes financially vulnerable. 
The result, in an extreme case, could be to put out of business the 
manufacturer who produces better products at more competitive 
prices, for reasons entirely unrelated to the shoe-manufacturing 
industry. This is not only an inefficient method of weeding out 
businesses but also unfair to the manufacturer and its employees.  
Allowing contract enforcement to hinge on parental status would 
also, in the long run, diminish the autonomy of parents themselves, 
thus impeding their ability to provide their children with optimal 
conditions of development. Were parents to potentially escape 
contractual liability whenever their children’s interests were at stake, 
parents would become less appealing as contractual partners. 
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Businesses would be less likely to enter into agreements with parties 
who have children, both in a commercial setting and in a consumer 
one. The result would be to disempower parents by making it more 
difficult for them to form binding agreements and thus to enter into 
employment, obtain credit, or purchase goods.323  
The difficulty here is comparable to the one addressed by this 
Article’s discussion of unconscionability doctrine.324 Absolving a 
certain group of responsibility for their contractual obligations—
whether it is parents or poor consumers—will make it more difficult 
for members of that group to take advantage of the benefits of 
contract law, such as enhancing autonomy and maximizing wealth. 
Just as Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. was criticized for 
potentially making it more difficult for inner-city residents to 
purchase goods on credit, differential treatment of contracts entered 
into by parents could have the same effect.325 It might be possible to 
address this problem through regulation that prohibits discrimination 
on the basis of parental status. But such regulation would be difficult 
to enforce, insofar as discrimination in choosing contractual partners 
is often difficult to prove. Thus, extending special protection to 
parents on a case-by-case basis could backfire, in ways that could 
ultimately diminish, rather than enhance, children’s future autonomy. 
For these reasons, it is generally not advisable to take children’s 
interests into account in private litigation that has no direct bearing 
on the children but affects them indirectly through their parents. 
Despite the good reasons for helping individual children, attending to 
their interests in such cases would impose the costs of doing so on 
private parties who have no reason to bear those costs, instead of 
distributing them across society more generally. This uneven and 
unpredictable distribution of costs on an unlucky few could, in turn, 
distort the goals of the doctrinal area of law at hand. In the contract 
context, for instance, attending to children’s interests in such cases 
would undermine the goals of contract law by creating inefficient and 
autonomy-reducing outcomes. 
Systemic Effect on Children. The analysis of whether to take 
children’s interests into account changes, however, in areas of private 
 
323. Moreover, if we were to take into account children’s interests at the 
time of contract enforcement, even those who seem like they might 
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law where children’s interests tend to be systemically—even if 
indirectly, and not inevitably—at stake. Consider, for instance, cases 
related to residential housing, such as those involving real estate 
contracts, leases, and mortgage agreements. More than a third of all 
households include at least one child under the age of eighteen.326 A 
legal dispute involving a home, then, has a fair chance of indirectly 
affecting a child to some degree. Other situations where a child is 
likely to be significantly affected by a private dispute involving a 
parent include personal bankruptcy proceedings, which can determine 
whether a parent will be able to support his or her family, and, for 
the same reason, certain types of employment disputes.  
Where we can isolate a subset of private law that is systemically 
likely to have a significant effect on children, it makes sense to think 
more carefully about whether to take children’s interests into account 
in cases involving their parents. Even here, however, taking children’s 
interests into account on a case-by-case basis—for instance, treating a 
foreclosure case differently when it involves a home where a child 
resides—would replicate the problems described in the preceding 
Section. To allow the outcome of any given case to hinge on the 
presence of children would inefficiently and unfairly burden whichever 
private actors happen to do business with parents. This burden, in 
turn, could make it more difficult for parents to enter into agreements 
in the first instance.  
But a case-by-case approach to children’s interests is not the only 
possible approach where children’s interests are systemically at stake. 
Here, rather than single out parents for special treatment, we can 
instead create across-the-board rules that will tend to protect children 
but will apply regardless of whether children are present in a 
particular case. For example, since children tend to live in family 
homes, we can create special rules that protect both the tenants and 
the purchasers of residential homes. This approach would still raise 
the problem of fairness, in that it would distribute the cost of 
attending to children’s interests to a particular group or industry, 
such as landlords or banks. But it would eliminate some of the 
inefficiency concerns that we saw in a case-by-case approach, in that 
all members of the industry—for instance, all landlords—would be 
subject to the same costs, and therefore none would suffer a 
competitive disadvantage. And an across-the-board approach would 
protect children’s interests without creating a situation in which 
parents are discriminated against by those who fear that their 
agreements will not be enforced.  
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3. Step Three: Balancing Children’s Interests Against Competing 
Concerns 
a. State Action Against Individuals—Case-by-Case Approach 
If we are to take children’s interests into account in cases 
involving state action against their parents, how should this be 
accomplished? The proposal this Article makes is a modest one. The 
Article does not suggest that children’s interests should trump all 
other considerations, or even that they should play a role in every 
case where they are at stake. To treat children’s interests as 
paramount outside the context of family law would render other areas 
of law unworkable. The goals of the relevant area of law must be 
given weight as well. 
What this Article suggests, rather, is that in a case where the 
state takes coercive action against a child’s parent, courts should 
consider how this will affect the child’s course of development and 
should be given the discretion to take the child’s interests into 
account accordingly. Where a decision will inflict significant harm on 
the child’s development, such that it will likely diminish the child’s 
eventual autonomy, the court should articulate this risk and balance 
it against all other relevant considerations before making a final 
determination. This balancing does not mean that the state should 
refrain from acting whenever a child will be harmed in the process. It 
means, rather, that where the state takes actions such as separating 
child from parent for a significant period of time, it should understand 
itself to be actively reshaping a child’s life and should do so only after 
determining that this is for the best, all things considered. 
One practical difficulty with this proposal is that a court without 
experience in family law may not be well equipped to articulate the 
effect of a decision on a child’s development. It is outside the scope of 
this Article to provide the definitive solution to this problem, but 
there are a number of possibilities. One is that the court could 
appoint a guardian ad litem, akin to those appointed in the family-
law context, in certain types of cases where children’s interests are 
significantly at stake, such as those involving the possibility of 
parental incarceration. The guardian could submit a report for the 
court’s consideration about the likely effect of potential outcomes on 
those children, and in developing this report the guardian could 
perhaps enlist the participation of expert witnesses such as those that 
currently testify in child custody cases. 
Another possibility, in the criminal law context, is that the 
corrections officials who write presentence reports can include in these 
an assessment of how the defendant’s children are likely to be affected 
by various sentencing alternatives.327 In 2009, San Francisco’s 
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Department of Probation began to take just such an approach by 
incorporating “family impact statements” into the presentence 
investigation reports that the department submits to sentencing 
courts. These statements describe each defendant’s caretaking 
responsibilities and assess the impact of various sentencing 
possibilities on the defendant’s minor children.328 The Osborne 
Association, a criminal justice advocacy group, has recommended the 
widespread adoption of family impact statements at sentencing and 
suggested that such reports be supplemented by defense attorneys or 
other advocates to ensure that sentencing judges, along with 
corrections officials, are aware of how defendants’ minor children are 
likely to be affected by their parents’ incarceration.329 
Even more problematic than how to make courts aware of 
children’s interests in cases involving their parents is how courts 
should balance children’s interests against other considerations, such 
as deterring crime. It is true, as opponents of considering children’s 
interests have observed, that any differential treatment of parents, 
however structured, may increase the likelihood that parents will 
commit crimes.330 But in criminal law as in other areas of law, 
considerations of legitimacy often outweigh, and can also be deeply 
related to, pragmatic concerns such as the reduction of crime. It is for 
this reason that we do not punish the innocent, even if this might 
help to deter crime in the short run.331 Moreover, even insofar as our 
goal in imposing criminal punishment is simply the instrumental one 
of reducing crime, taking children’s interests into account may well 
promote that goal by reducing the likelihood that they commit crimes 
themselves.332 This Article argues that the benefits of protecting 
children’s future autonomy—and, more generally, of considering the 
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connection between children’s interests and the goals and premises of 
the relevant area of law—are sufficient to merit at least considering 
how children are affected by coercive state action against their 
parents, and balancing this against competing concerns, even though 
doing so will necessarily have some counterproductive incentive 
effects.  
The hope of this Article is that articulating the effect of legal 
decision making on children’s development will encourage more 
innovative thinking about how to reconcile children’s interests with 
competing and equally significant policy goals. In the parental 
incarceration context, for instance, there may be ways of achieving 
the usual goals of criminal law—namely, deterrence, retribution, 
rehabilitation, and incapacitation—while also avoiding the infliction of 
harm on a developing child. One possibility, in cases involving 
nonviolent first-time offenders, would be to defer the parent’s 
incarceration to an extent that would minimize harm to the child, for 
instance by waiting until the child has reached a developmental stage 
where the separation will be less damaging.333 Another would be to 
consider alternatives to incarceration, such as fines and community 
service.334 While these and other child-protective approaches to 
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parental incarceration have been criticized as undermining the fairness 
and legitimacy of criminal law,335 from the perspective of protecting 
children’s future autonomy, they can be seen, instead, as enhancing 
the legitimacy of criminal law, or of any area of law that treats adults 
as if they are autonomous. 
b. Litigation Between Private Parties—Systemic Approach 
In most instances of litigation between private parties, children’s 
interests should not be considered in cases that affect them only 
indirectly, for the reasons set forth in the preceding Section.336 The 
one subset of private litigation where the indirect effect on children 
should play a role is where cases tend to affect children systemically 
and in a significant way, as in foreclosure proceedings and other 
litigation involving eviction from family homes. Here, for the reasons 
explained above,337 children’s interests should be taken into account 
not on a case-by-case basis, but through presumptions and rules that 
protect children but apply across the board.  
This proposal, in fact, is consistent with much of what we already 
do, although it is not always framed as such. Take, for instance, the 
warranty of habitability, which is implied by law into every lease of 
residential property.338 The warranty of habitability requires that 
every residence meet a certain minimum standard of safety and 
livability.339 This warranty extends protection from dangerous 
conditions to a large class of children, namely, all children who live in 
rented homes. While early case law on the warranty of habitability 
sometimes mentions the protection of children as a rationale for 
imposing the warranty,340 the rule does not single out children for 
 
Jr., Prison Nurseries: A Pathway to Crime-Free Futures, 34 
Corrections Compendium, Spring 2009, at 17, 18–19 (2009) (noting 
that, as of 2009, nine states offered either prison nursery programs or 
residential treatment centers for incarcerated mothers, and two more 
were considering similar programs). 
335. See discussion supra Part II.A.3. 
336. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.b. 
337. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.b. 
338. 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 447 (2006). 
339. Id. 
340. See, e.g., P.H. Inv. v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah 1991) (noting 
that tenant “with little or no resources or income, with seven children, 
and pregnant” is “typical of the individuals we sought to protect by 
adopting the warranty of habitability”); Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 
202, 206 (Vt. 1984) (mentioning danger to tenant’s child and 
grandchild, including possibility “that her two year old child might cut 
herself on the shards of glass” from a broken window, in holding that a 
warranty of habitability is implied in every lease concerning a residential 
dwelling unit). 
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protection, and extends to childless homes as well. We thus have an 
across-the-board rule that tends toward the protection of children, 
without requiring that tenants with children be accorded special 
treatment.  
Children’s interests are arguably also behind our current across-
the-board rules governing foreclosure law—witness the repeated 
reference to children and “families” in recent debates on the subject.341 
The protection of children from extreme deprivation may well be 
behind bankruptcy law as well. While there is little direct discussion 
of how children’s interests are at stake in the bankruptcy context, it 
is often claimed that one of the traditional goals of bankruptcy is to 
enable the breadwinner to support his or her dependents, many of 
whom are typically children.342  
Because the discussion of children’s interests in these contexts is 
typically oblique, there is little explicit assessment of whether and 
why children’s interests should factor into legal decisionmaking. We 
should make explicit the extent to which the protection of children’s 
interests might drive some of the generally applicable rules that we 
already do apply in various areas of law, as well consider creating new 
rules to achieve this same goal. 
Even when we decide to protect children through a rule that 
applies across the board, instead of on a case-by-case basis, the 
question of whether to impose a child-protective rule in the first 
instance will necessarily be a matter of extensive debate. In the 
housing context, for instance, many vigorously oppose across-the-
board rules, such as rent control and the warranty of habitability, 
that shift burdens from tenants to landlords. These rules are criticized 
as unfair redistributions of wealth, and some claim that they are 
inefficient and harm both tenants and landlords by artificially 
distorting the housing market.343 It is not within the scope of this 
Article to resolve that debate here. The goal, rather, is to add to the 
debate a consideration of children’s interests, and of the ways in 
which one or another rule will affect the likelihood that children will 
develop into autonomous adults capable of making free, rational, and 
efficiency-enhancing decisions of their own. 
 
341. See discussion supra Part II.B.3. 
342. See discussion supra Part II.B.3. 
343. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 206, at 445–48 (arguing that housing code 
enforcement disadvantages landlords and tenants alike by driving up 
landlords’ maintenance costs and reducing the supply of low-income 
housing).  
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Conclusion 
Family-law scholars are currently engaged in challenging family 
law’s exceptional status. One aspect of this challenge has been a call 
to expand the boundaries of family law by importing the tools and 
insights of other fields. This Article argues that the process of 
doctrinal influence should go both ways: Scholars across the legal 
canon should be encouraged to consider how family law’s insights 
relate to discussions and debates within their respective fields. 
The Article has begun this project by demonstrating the relevance 
of children’s interests in cases involving their parents—an issue today 
either largely overlooked or too easily dismissed—to seemingly 
unrelated debates within criminal law and contract law. Consideration 
of children’s interests, and of why and how childhood matters, is 
largely cabined within the exceptional realm of family law. Yet, as 
this Article has shown, children’s development can be affected, often 
profoundly, by cases involving their parents across a number of 
doctrinal fields. These effects, in turn, have bearing on the likelihood 
that children will become what each of these fields will later presume 
them to be: an adult legal subject who is autonomous, in the sense of 
both rational and free, and as such can be held responsible for his or 
her actions and decisions. 
The perspective of family law thus brings out a previously 
unrecognized connection between how a doctrinal area of law treats 
children and the assumptions that will be applied to each child upon 
reaching adulthood. The Article argues that if an area of law, such as 
criminal law or contracts, is to treat adults as if they are autonomous 
and to hold them responsible accordingly, then it has a corresponding 
obligation to consider taking into account the ways in which legal 
decision making affects children’s future autonomy, or any other 
relevant aspects of adult capacity. 
  
 
   
